

Executive Summary of the Thirty-Sixth Plenary Meeting



Department of Defense

Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

November 18-19, 2015

Arlington, VA

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OPR: DTRA/J2/5/8R-AC (Advisory Committees and Programs Office)

DATE: January 27, 2016

Executive Summary
Of The Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Department of Defense
Threat Reduction Advisory Committee
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CENTRA Technology, Inc.
Arlington, VA

Certified True and Correct.

APPROVED:



Ronald F. Lehman, II
Chair
Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

OPR: J2/5/8R-AC (Advisory Committees and Programs Office)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Thirty-Sixth meeting of the Department of Defense (DoD) Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) convened at CENTRA Technologies, Inc., Arlington, Virginia, November 18-19, 2015.

In accordance with Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. Appendix and 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.155, it was determined that this meeting of the TRAC concerned classified information and matters covered by 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1) and as such, the meeting was closed to the public. The meeting subject matter involved classified information directly related to national security issues. Access to such information is limited to personnel with appropriate security clearances and a specific “need to know.” Disclosure of the DoD TRAC deliberations would have a grave impact on United States (U.S.) National Security; therefore, all activities were withheld in the public interest and were announced in the Federal Register. Appendices A and B list the meeting agenda and attendees.

TRAC Chair, Ambassador Ronald Lehman, opened the Thirty-Sixth TRAC Plenary by welcoming committee members, senior leaders, and guests. Amb Lehman’s opening remarks highlighted successful recommendations previously developed by the Committee and called for greater interaction with senior leaders. Amb Lehman solicited suggestions from the members on how best to engage with senior leaders so that the TRAC’s recommendations are timely and value added. He cited the Global Health Preparatory Group on Ebola and the Syria chemical weapons disposition as examples of real-time TRAC involvement during a challenging time for the Department. Amb Lehman also requested members review the draft terms of reference (TORs) for the proposed preparatory groups on Russia and China.

Following Amb Lehman’s remarks, Dr. Susan Holley and other representatives of the intelligence community delivered a briefing on the status of chemical weapon threats specific to state and non-state actors. The briefing addressed terrorist groups’ capabilities, goals, strategies, and interests in chemical and biological weapons (CBW), and drew distinctions between different terrorist groups. The majority of this discussion was held at the classified level.

After Dr. Holley’s briefing, Dr. Ralph Kerr and Mr. Jeffrey Steel of the Joint Requirements Office (JRO), part of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, joined the group to present the Risk Assessments Analysis on chemical and biological threats. One objective of the analysis is to identify threats that can be taken off the table—threats that are either at a low or moderate risk—so resources can focus on the development of countermeasure targeted to the higher threats. The JRO detailed the study’s concept and discussed various planning scenarios conducted thus far. The analysis was vetted and modeled by the Institute for Defense Analysis. Moving forward, JRO is planning to do more capabilities-based assessments and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) validation. TRAC members discussed the JRO methodology and data collection and challenged some of the graphical depictions of the analysis. The TRAC asked Dr. Chris Hassell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and

Biological Defense (DASD/CBD), about the best means of incorporating the findings into solutions and capabilities that support the mission. JRO acknowledges the close collaboration with the Chemical and Biological Defense Office (CBD) and emphasized that the project is still in its beginning stages. JRO would expand the study's scope but fiscal considerations have constrained some of those plans. The TRAC asked to be kept apprised of future iterations of the analysis.

Following Dr. Kerr's presentation, DASD Hassell briefed the group on the Department of Defense Anthrax Laboratory Report on the unintentional shipment of live anthrax spores. The report found that the inactivation failure was due to a lack of analysis for viable spore quantities treated in the gamma cell irradiator. This resulted in incomplete spore inactivation prior to shipping. The report recommends updating the lab's standard operating procedures to include inactivation verification at each step of the process and providing documentation validating the gamma cell irradiator inactivation process at variable spore quantities. Amb Lehman asked if JRO should do an assessment that addresses the risk of inactive spores. Members commented on the need for responsible risk management that is made more difficult by advancing technology's changing impact on risk levels.

Mr. Daniel Burgess of the Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Office provided a presentation on the nexus of Cyber and Nuclear Physical Security. He highlighted an on-going congressionally-mandated study on operational and inter-operational cybersecurity that is examining cyber vulnerabilities. OT&E is conducting exercises with combatant commands (CCMDs) and other U.S. Government Agencies in support of this study. The assessments thus far have identified implementation measures to counter the observed vulnerabilities. OT&E cited U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)'s protocols and Computer Network Defense Service Providers, but these are unique to USTRANSCOM's mission. Mr. Burgess then provided the members with a video on cyber that was classified.

Following this video presentation, Hon. Joseph Benkert delivered the Nuclear Strategic Stability (NSS) Preparatory Group's Report. The NSS Group examined aspects of the U.S. nuclear related missions from plans to exercises to weapons and delivery systems. The group also researched regional crisis/conflict efforts and what requirements exist for nuclear strategic stability, extended deterrence, and assurance of Allies in the context of key regions. The report will be published in early 2016.

Hon. Michael Nacht and Ms. Eileen Vergino updated TRAC members on the work of the North Korea Preparatory Group. The North Korea Group has had several meetings and met with a cross section of experts from the DoD, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Department of State (DoS), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The North Korea Preparatory Group was tasked with examining the DoD's enduring WMD elimination mission, readiness, and coordination with the Republic of Korea (ROK). This includes how roles, responsibilities, and capabilities will evolve

in the coming years, among the Army, USSTRATCOM, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States Forces Korea (USFK), DTRA, the ROK, and other relevant entities. The focus of the group is to assess whether there are sufficient technical capabilities, political tools, and agreements in place for a rapid response and effective elimination of North Korea's WMD. Dr. Nacht and Ms. Vergino will be planning subsequent meetings to develop a deeper understanding of the issues. The Group expects to have preliminary recommendations to present at the spring plenary in 2016.

Dr. Miriam John and Amb Robert Joseph presented a status report of the DTRA Futures Preparatory Group. DTRA Director Kenneth Myers specifically requested that TRAC study the Agency's future challenges due to concerns about an over-attention to short-term episodic crises at the expense of the long-term, steady-state missions. Dr. John described DTRA's current organization and offered an update on changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for DTRA USSOCOM, and USSTRATCOM. The DTRA Group has held numerous meetings with DTRA staff and leadership, and organizations familiar with DTRA and will convene additional meetings in December. Preliminary recommendations will be briefed at the next Plenary.

On day two, Amb Lehman offered remarks about the previous day's briefings and expressed TRAC's appreciation for the DASDs' participation at the Plenary. He then offered the floor to Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Dr. Hopkins gave an overview of NCB's current and planned maintenance and modernization efforts in the nuclear realm. He expressed NCB's concerns and called for reinvestment in the mission in order to preserve the deterrence approach to national defense.

This prompted a general debate on the continued reliance on the existing nuclear triad model. Some members questioned if deterrence could still respond to the rapidly changing threats and conditions and called for greater flexibility and agility. Others stressed the need to reexamine the triad concept and structure, and recommended an open debate on the deterrent mission prior to the planned modernization program's implementation. Some suggested conducting a Blue Ribbon Commission to evaluate force structure and determine the most appropriate nuclear posture and strategy. Dr. Hopkins acknowledged the comments and suggestions.

Dr. Hopkins then referenced the cyber threat video the group received the previous day and offered some thoughts on cyber security from his recent trip to the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado. He stressed that cyber has the potential to effect all branches of the military and impact all DoD missions. Connections between cyber security and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology for example are a recent concern for the Department. Dr. John recalled for the group that the Navy leadership had become convinced of the importance of cyber threats and was in the process of address its cyber vulnerabilities. She said with the right pressure, NCB

could do the same. Dr. Hopkins offered to provide the TRAC with a report from the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations' High Level Group on cyber and nuclear security.

Dr. Hopkins also provided the TRAC with an update on changes pursuant to the UCP and the transfer of the CWMD mission to USSOCOM. USSOCOM is evaluating how to approach the synchronization role but has not confirmed any course of action. The group then discussed changes to the Joint Improvised Defeat Agency (JIDA) (formerly Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)) and its future relationship with DTRA.

Following Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Kadlec presented the results of the Biological Defense Blue Ribbon Panel, established in 2014 with the aim of providing a comprehensive assessment of the state of U.S. biodefense efforts. The panel identified several serious gaps and recommended actions to correct them. At present, there is a lack of centralized command and leadership to coordinate action across departments and agencies in the event of a biological incident. The panel called for tighter coordination and collaboration between agencies and departments. The panel also recommended institutionalizing control in the Office of the Vice President with a senior person dedicated solely to biodefense to aid in coordinating response and in promoting innovation. However, the report emphasizes that biodefense is not simply a federal issue, and departments must also work to build capacity at the state, regional, and tribal levels. Dr. Kadlec offered that the report contains comprehensive guidance, but lacks an implementation plan. Members discussed the need to formulate a strong scientific basis for a fixed set of rules and regulatory principles in the implementation process.

Dr. Hopkins asked for an opportunity for the CBD office under Dr. Hassell to come back to the TRAC and provide a response to some of the Blue Ribbon Commission findings.

Following this discussion, Dr. Richard Kline of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) provided the TRAC with a classified briefing on China's nuclear weapons modernization efforts.

The meeting concluded with a discussion on the proposed stand-up of Russia and China Preparatory Groups. Members provided comments on the draft TORs circulated on the previous day. TRAC members raised cyber and cross-domain issues that need to be included in both studies. With regard to China, several members recommended conducting a detailed examination of Chinese nuclear strategy and how nuclear weapons fit into the larger Chinese military doctrine. The group debated the scope and purpose of the study and questioned who the final audience would be for the reports. Amb Lehman proffered that the study's recommendations will primarily impact the next administration and the group recommended the real focus should be the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2017. Members agreed there should be two separate TORs with continual discourse between the groups.

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Ambassador Lehman advised the members that the next Plenary would be at USSOCOM in April and that he would provide specific dates as soon as possible. He adjourned the meeting at 1430 on November 19, 2015.

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