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House Armed Services Committee

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On

Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, Chemical Biological
Defense Program, and Counterproliferation
Initiatives

Before

Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services

U.S. House of Representatives

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Introduction

Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Miller, and members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be here today to address the counterproliferation programs performed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). I will summarize my remarks and ask that my complete statement be made part of the record.

The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military personnel of DTRA is to safeguard the United States and its allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN), as well as high yield explosives capable of destroying buildings and critical infrastructure by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate and counter the threat, and mitigate its effect. The proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related knowledge and materials pose a grave and current threat that is growing and evolving. The need to develop and field improved Countering-WMD capabilities is more important than ever.

In addition to serving as the Director of DTRA, I am also the Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). Co-located with DTRA and fully integrated within the daily activities of the agency, the SCC-WMD assists the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) with the synchronization of Countering-WMD planning and coordination of related DoD activities across the Combatant Commands and with our interagency partners, identification of Countering-WMD capability needs, and advocacy for Countering-WMD capabilities.

The Department places the Countering-WMD mission among its top priorities and the DTRA Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) budget request responds to this and, in particular, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) initiatives. The requested 18% increase over last year's appropriation represents the first significant growth in the DTRA budget since the agency's establishment nearly 12 years ago. My remarks will cover the intended purposes for this increased investment and how it directly contributes to or supports counterproliferation. In addition, I will explain why I am confident that DTRA can efficiently and effectively manage this budget growth.

DTRA Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships

DTRA provides Countering-WMD expertise and support at strategic (global and national), operational (regional and theater), and tactical (battlefield) levels. The agency initiates, stimulates, and participates in interagency, bilateral, and multilateral partnerships, often providing the essential expertise and leadership to get programs established and projects moving. However, the primary role of DTRA in the global Countering-WMD effort is that of an executing agency. Our programs support the full range of the National Strategy to Combat WMD: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. In partnership with others across the U.S. Government (USG), the private sector, and our overseas allies and friends, DTRA integrates a wide range of Countering-WMD technical, operational, and intelligence subject matter expertise to provide integrated, readily applicable solutions to Countering-WMD challenges.

DTRA provides its Countering-WMD expertise and responds to tasking through three distinct chains of command. First, as the DoD

Countering-WMD Combat Support Agency, DTRA provides direct support and assistance to the Combatant Commanders and is tasked directly by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, as a DoD agency, DTRA reports through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Third, as the Director of the SCC-WMD, I also report to the Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM).

While DTRA civilians and military personnel directly perform many of the agency's Countering-WMD activities, we also rely heavily upon contractors for the performance of parts of our mission. This is particularly the case for our Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program, whose performers include the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, the Service laboratories, and the RDT&E capabilities of our interagency partners, private industry, academia, and international partners.

Although DTRA was formally established on 1 October 1998, the agency directly traces its origin to the 1940s Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb. Therefore, the agency and its predecessors have been acquiring and expanding CWMD expertise for nearly 70 years.

U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD

This expertise made DTRA the logical place for the CDRUSSTRATCOM to establish the SCC-WMD in support of his new responsibilities assigned in 2005 to synchronize DoD Countering-WMD planning activities across the Combatant Commands and with interagency

partners, identify needed Countering-WMD capabilities, and advocate for their development. The SCC-WMD leverages DTRA's full expertise, tools and capabilities. DTRA leverages SCC-WMD activity to improve its support to the warfighters and is a direct beneficiary of the CDRUSSTRATCOM's advocacy for improved Countering-WMD capabilities. USSTRATCOM has worked with OSD, DOE, and other Federal agencies to improve coordination across the CWMD mission. It completed Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 8099-08 Global Combating WMD Campaign Plan in March 2009, which incorporates national-level guidance for Countering-WMD with the Guidance for Employment of the Forces and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2008 (JSCP 08). CONPLAN 8099-08 synchronizes DoD Countering-WMD plans by providing a common framework and methodology for Countering-WMD planning which puts into effect a DoD-specific global strategy for the Countering-WMD mission. USSTRATCOM also completed a Joint Integrating Concept, approved in December 2007, for Countering-WMD that describes how a Joint Force Commander will conduct future Countering-WMD operations. Based on CONPLAN 8099 and other analytical efforts not previously captured in Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documentation, USSTRATCOM produced a CWMD Joint Capabilities Document (JCD). The JCD, which was approved in October 2008, documents and prioritizes Combatant Command capability needs. Additionally, the Countering-WMD JCD forms the basis for initiating programs and making associated decisions and funding requests.

Strategy and Direction

Although the Countering-WMD mission is relatively new for DoD, it now rests upon maturing strategies and direction. For example, the

recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that: "The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves." The QDR also states that the most troubling threat would be the instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state. Defending the U.S. against a catastrophic WMD attack is a vital national interest.

As the Countering-WMD mission matures, so do the relationships among those implementing it supporting programs. In House Report 111-166, the report accompanying the Committee's National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10), the Committee expressed the view that efforts, initiatives, and interagency coordination for the programs associated with counterproliferation have been improving over the past several years. However, the Committee also directed the Comptroller General to assess definitional clarity and commonality of usage regarding counterproliferation across the USG and to provide recommendations for improvements. DTRA appreciates the opportunity to address the Committee's concerns in this regard. The agency has, with others in the Department, met with the General Accountability Office (GAO) on this matter and the effort continues.

As the QDR notes, our capabilities must provide for a defense-in-depth against WMD attack based on multiple opportunities to prevent or respond to WMD threats. However, we need to think beyond defeating and defending against WMD threats to deterring such threats. WMD deterrence is also an important theme in Joint Publication 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, dated 10 June 2009, which states that WMD deterrence has shifted from a Cold War focus on a very small number of actors to a wide perspective on multiple and varied actors with multiple means of attack at their disposal. Traditional economic, diplomatic, informational and military deterrent measures, including the threat of overwhelming response, remain key aspects of deterrence, especially against state actors and state-sponsored terrorist groups. However, the difficulty of definitively attributing the source of a WMD attack, as well as the emergence of terrorists whose values and decision making process may be difficult to analyze, makes the capability to deny adversaries' objectives an increasingly important element of WMD deterrence.

The QDR and the DTRA Budget Request

Through the QDR, the Secretary has directed the undertaking of these initiatives, for which DTRA and/or the SCC-WMD have a direct or supporting role:

- Establish a Joint Task Force-Elimination Headquarters to better plan, train, and execute WMD elimination operations with increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and interagency coordination capabilities.
- Research countermeasures and defenses to meet emerging Non-Traditional Agents.

- Enhance nuclear forensics to meet the needs of the national attribution process, prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification and apprehension of an attacker, and strengthen deterrence against the use of nuclear and radiological weapons by state and non-state actors.
- Secure vulnerable nuclear materials at the source and promote stringent nuclear security practices for civilian and defense facilities across the globe in support of the President's Global Lockdown Initiative.
- Expand the Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) Program beyond the Former Soviet Union (FSU) by partnering with nations around the world to improve their capabilities for detecting, diagnosing, and determining the origin of pathogens to improve U.S. authorities to better respond to future disease outbreaks and identify whether they are natural or man-made. This effort is part of the new *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*, issued on 23 November 2009 as part of Presidential Policy Directive-2.
- Develop new verification and monitoring technologies to support a robust arms control, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation agenda.

I will now explain how the DTRA FY11 budget request responds to these initiatives. The 18% budget growth requested for FY11 represents the first significant growth in resources – funding and personnel - since the agency was established in October 1998. It calls for complementary investments across nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management, as well as needed investment in DTRA information technology and infrastructure support

essential for the global conduct of expanded Countering-WMD activities and programs

The QDR and DTRA FY11 Funding Increases

DTRA is requesting \$522 million for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that will be expanded worldwide to support the President's goals of "locking down" weapons-grade nuclear materials and expanding biological threat reduction activities; \$463 million in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding for arms control monitoring and verification, Countering-WMD support to the Combatant Commanders, training and education provided through Defense Threat Reduction University, and core operational support; and over \$562 million for research and development leading to new Countering-WMD capabilities. In addition, DTRA will execute over \$631 million in Chemical-Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Science and Technology (S&T) programs that support counterproliferation and consequence management. I will now turn to the details of the budget request.

Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials DTRA is requesting \$89 million in new funding for the QDR-directed Global Nuclear Lockdown project within the Nunn-Lugar CTR program for the execution of the DoD part of the President's initiative to secure vulnerable fissile materials worldwide by the end of 2012, sustain security upgrades made, and transition enduring responsibilities to the respective countries by 2014. DTRA has been performing such activities for many years in Russia through the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security and Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security projects. For example, as a result of the Bratislava Agreement, DoD and the Department of

Energy (DOE) partnered to upgrade security at Russian nuclear weapon storage sites by providing training, equipment, and technical assistance. This program has also funded the establishment of security training facilities in Russia to improve security capabilities and provides secure railcars for the movement of nuclear warheads from operational sites to secure storage sites and from there to dismantlement facilities. The requested budget growth would accelerate nuclear security upgrades in the Russian Federation and permit the establishment of Centers for Nuclear Security in countries beyond the FSU. Attainment of the President's goals to improve the security of the vulnerable fissile materials around the world will significantly reduce the threat that our counterproliferation programs may need to address.

Biological Threat Reduction The Nunn-Lugar CTR Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) program consolidates dangerous pathogens into safe and secure repositories; enhances threat agent surveillance, detection, and response systems; and provides for collaborative biological research with successor states to the former Soviet Union. The QDR calls for expanding this effort to other nations around the world. The FY11 budget request for the expanded efforts includes an increase of \$54 million in new funding. This will permit the commissioning and sustainment of a Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Georgia; oversight of CRL construction in Azerbaijan; construction of a CRL in Kazakhstan; design completion and permit work for a CRL in Ukraine; sustainment of 40 Zonal Diagnostic Labs and training for scientists in these partner nations; development and implementation of the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia,

Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; and, through the Cooperative Biological Engagement program, minimal bio security upgrades and EIDSS implementation as new partnerships beyond the former Soviet Union are established. These efforts are being conducted in close coordination with other USG organizations including the Department of State (DOS), HHS including its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Agriculture. This effort directly supports the Combatant Commanders by improving their situational awareness of dangerous disease outbreaks and biological attacks, reducing potential bio threats, and expanding partner capability in their areas of operation. It will also enable the U.S. to better respond to future disease outbreaks and assist in identifying whether they are natural or manmade. This critical nonproliferation investment will reduce the size and scope of the threat that counterproliferation and consequence management challenge we will face in the future.

Arms Control Technology DTRA is the national execution agency for arms control inspection and escort, and is a key participant in monitoring activities. The agency advises on monitoring and verification technologies for arms control negotiators and assists USG and private organizations subject to foreign inspections. Additionally, DTRA is implementing the President's arms control vision of revitalizing arms control as a Countering-WMD tool. Accordingly, DTRA is requesting \$9.2 million in new funding to reestablish an arms control monitoring and verification technology project as part of the agency's RDT&E program. We are developing a strategy for expanded verification and monitoring of lower nuclear weapons levels and a nuclear test ban, and setting the foundation for future arms control initiatives by exploring technological challenges and opportunities in

fissile material production and detection, accounting of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, and differentiating between various warhead contents. Without this new investment, arms control technology will lag rather than precede and inform our arms control proposals, resulting in missed opportunities that could reduce the size and scope of future WMD threats.

Combating WMD Terrorism DTRA provides technical support to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Combating WMD Terrorism (CWMD-T) mission. Specifically, DTRA enhances Special Operations Forces (SOF) operational capabilities through identification, familiarization, and delivery of new and emerging technologies. We develop test programs to support USSOCOM and its components; deliver emerging technology solutions; provide equipment familiarization; and perform RDT&E to eliminate the threat of Improvised Nuclear Devices, defeat WMD pathways, and develop technologies to interdict, disrupt, and neutralize terrorist ability to acquire and use WMD. The agency is requesting \$27.9 million in new funding in FY11 to accelerate research on the defeat of improvised WMD threats by two to three years, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks on U.S. forces at home and overseas, as well as the U.S. homeland. DTRA is also requesting an additional \$19.8 million to provide improved intelligence fusion, analysis, and planning assistance to USSOCOM to support operational planning and the conduct of counterproliferation and counterterrorism operations.

Nuclear Detection A top priority for the DTRA RDT&E program is the development of significantly improved nuclear detection capability.

Thanks to increased funding made available by DoD and the Congress in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, DTRA has a strong and promising effort focused on potentially “game-changing” active standoff nuclear detection, as well as needed improvements to existing passive capabilities. DTRA also performs technology development and procures equipment for the Combatant Commanders to search, locate, and identify radiological and nuclear threats. The agency is requesting \$19 million in new funding in FY11 to support the standup of two additional nuclear search teams for the Combatant Commanders. DTRA is also requesting \$5 million in new funding to develop passive detection technologies and components that will reduce dependency upon the nation’s dwindling stock of Helium-3, allow for the continuing development of neutron detection technologies, and provide a path forward for future generations of neutron sensitive systems. Although DoD environment for its nuclear detection mission lacks the inherent infrastructure available for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOE nuclear detection missions, all three departments coordinate their related efforts regarding the basic science.

Reachback Support The national and DoD leadership, Combatant Commanders, our interagency partners such as the DHS and HHS, and first responders increasingly rely upon DTRA provided Countering-WMD reachback support. In just a few years, the number of reachback requests that the agency has answered has grown from several hundred annually to over 1,000 in 2009. Moreover, the requests are becoming more sophisticated, the extent of analysis required to respond is increasing, and the expectations for near real time responses are growing. Therefore, DTRA is requesting \$3.0 million in new funding in FY11 for a technology demonstration to

provide reachback support in minutes instead of hours or days to the Combatant Commanders and first responders. This technology demonstration will focus on the development of decision support and analysis tools for more accurately predicting the spread of pandemic diseases. We are also requesting growth in our Operations and Maintenance appropriation for essential IT upgrades that will enable us to meet the warfighters' expectations for Reachback support.

Counter-WMD Analysis Cell The Counter-WMD Analysis Cell (C-WAC) is a collaborative venture by DTRA and the Defense Intelligence Agency to enhance the fusion of Countering-WMD technical and intelligence expertise to better support the Combatant Commanders. The warfighters use information provided by C-WAC to devise concepts for disrupting or defeating adversary WMD programs. DTRA is requesting \$2 million in new funding to expand the analytical capabilities of the cell and its application to WMD threats, particularly to permit "deep dive" analysis of adversary processes, facilities and vulnerabilities.

Information Technology and Infrastructure Support

My greatest concerns regarding the future ability of DTRA and the SCC-WMD to perform their mission have to do with IT shortfalls in the systems we rely on to support growing customer needs and our expanding global mission, a larger workforce in response to expanded activities to meet the growing threat, and the necessary infrastructure to support that workforce. Therefore, DTRA is requesting \$32 million in new O&M funding for these critical mission enablers. Without this additional funding, DTRA will be hard pressed to deliver the improved

capabilities previously mentioned. The specific purposes for this funding are:

- IT Support - \$15.3 million for information system replacements, upgrades, and software licenses; outfitting of additional leased office space; and ensuring all related IT security needs are met. This investment is essential for technical reachback support, intelligence analysis, and the DTRA Operations Center.
- Infrastructure Support - \$14.8 million for leasing and furnishing additional workspace for the expanding DTRA workforce; acceleration in workforce hiring including security clearance processing and mandatory training; specialized support for increased contracting needs.
- Future Operating System - \$1 million for the evaluation of the current IT infrastructure; test and evaluation of various solutions to shortfalls; and design and implementation plan development and software suite upgrades toward the Future Operating System.
- Data Replication - \$1 million to comply with requirements for off-site data replication/storage to support disaster recovery capabilities, mission assurance, and DoD continuity of operations.

As you consider our requested mission growth, I ask that you also support the budget growth essential to mission success.

Current Support to Other Counterproliferation Efforts

I will now address how current DTRA and SCC-WMD programs contribute to counterproliferation efforts.

Joint Task Force-Elimination Headquarters The QDR calls for the establishment of a Joint Task Force Elimination-Headquarters to better plan, train, and execute WMD elimination operations with increased

disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination capabilities. DTRA and the SCC-WMD are assisting the DoD effort, led by the Joint Staff, to identify and define specific options that could satisfy this departmental need.

Enhanced Nuclear Forensics DTRA is the lead organization in the National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) program for managing post-detonation nuclear forensics R&D programs, and closely coordinates these programs with the U.S. Air Force and other DoD and non-DoD NTNF-relevant R&D programs. Additionally working closely with the DOE, the agency maintains a post-detonation ground collection capability, and is working closely with the U.S. Army to transition this capability to the 20th Support Command CBRNE. DTRA together with USSTRATCOM as the sponsor continues to support the NTNF Joint Concept Technology Development (JCTD) to address the shortfalls and gaps in nuclear/radiological forensics. Improved nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities will significantly strengthen deterrence against WMD attacks.

Counter Non-Traditional Threat Agents As the executor of the CBDP S&T, DTRA is developing solutions for detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination, and protection for doctrine, equipment, and training to the warfighter for defense against Non-Traditional Threat Agents (NTAs) that may result from the globalization of chemical and biological knowledge. DoD has developed a plan with interagency partners regarding the development of defensive countermeasures to such a threat. In the near term, the agency will accelerate the expansion of scientific understanding of the

physical properties of and medical countermeasures against NTAs and field interim defense capabilities.

Bio Defense Fusion The SCC-WMD enhances Countering-WMD situational awareness by fusing near real time, open source information and classified data into actionable indications and warnings intelligence in support of warfighter force protection and continuity of operations. This effort places special emphasis on indicators associated with natural and intentional biological threats.

WMD Combat Support DTRA provides a wide-range of Countering-WMD expertise to the Combatant Commanders including planning, training, and national-level exercise support; support to WMD accident/incident response; and support to current military operations. DTRA maintains globally deployable Technical Support Teams and Consequence Management Advisory Teams that provide equipment, training, and technical and operational subject matter expertise for the Combatant Commands.

Nuclear Mission Support DTRA supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense on programs that provide oversight for the DoD nuclear mission, and performs Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections so that the Secretary and Chairman have independent assessments of the mission performance of nuclear capable units. The agency performs nuclear weapon stockpile tracking and accounting for the Joint Staff and provides expertise in the areas of nuclear weapons safety, security, training, exercises, publications, and logistics.

International Counterproliferation Program The International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) is a DoD-led interagency effort that is an effective Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation tool to combat the trafficking of WMD and related material in some areas of the world. The requested FY11 funding would permit expanded training assistance in conjunction with our Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and DHS partners in the areas of border security, customs, and law enforcement with partner nations that have made long-term commitments to work cooperatively with the United States.

Proliferation Security Initiative The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international cooperative effort to stop trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. It is designed to support efforts to defeat WMD proliferation through international cooperation, information sharing and capacity building in cooperating states. With 96 participating nations, the PSI has proven itself an effective international forum supporting common counterproliferation goals. In support of the President's goal to turn the PSI into a durable international institution, the SCC-WMD supports the Joint Staff, OSD, the Combatant Commanders, and interagency and international partners with PSI training. The SCC-WMD is also embedding PSI-related activities into existing Combatant Commander exercises, thereby enhancing Combatant Commanders' security cooperation efforts and improving partners' interdiction capabilities.

Small Arms and Light Weapons DTRA's expertise in accounting for weapons covered by arms control treaties is being applied in a new

manner. The DTRA Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Program assesses host nation arms, ammunition, and explosive (AA&E) stockpiles, conducts seminars to orient participants to international best practices for and recommends ways to improve the Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) of AA&E. This program has provided PSSM orientation to over 1,000 foreign government officials in over 50 countries worldwide. The SALW Program also provides recommendations on the destruction of unsafe, unsecured, and excess weapons and ammunition. DTRA provides its assessment reports to the DOS Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement which, when requested by a foreign government, uses these reports to provide physical security upgrades and destruction assistance. Through this effort, DTRA has contributed to the destruction of over one million SALW, 90 million rounds of ammunition, and over 30,000 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems.

Hard Target Defeat DTRA develops technologies and demonstrates end-to-end capabilities to defeat Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs), many of which are associated with WMD, their means of delivery, and related command and control. The objectives of the HDBT RDT&E program are to rapidly transition emerging technologies to the warfighter through JCTDs and Quick Reaction Capability projects; demonstrate novel tactics, techniques, and procedures to defeat HDBTs; and develop models for HDBT defeat planning and decision support tools. DTRA recently completed a series of tests for the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) program, the largest air-deliverable conventional weapon available for the non-nuclear defeat of HDBTs, and continues to support Air Force-sponsored MOP testing. This successful program transition from DTRA to the Air

Force was largely due to the close teamwork between DTRA's CWMD Technology Directorate at the Defense Threat Reduction Center on Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the DTRA Weapons and Capabilities Division on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; and the DTRA Test Support Directorate on Kirtland Air Force Base and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Our HDBT defeat efforts benefit from a unique partnership between DTRA and the Defense Intelligence Agency Underground Facility Analysis Center. This collaboration brings the R&D and intelligence communities together in a joint effort to provide warfighters with the information and tools necessary to defeat HDBTs and counter WMD.

System Survivability DTRA develops technologies to protect military systems against the effects of radiation and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Agency radiation-hardened technology and nanotechnology R&D keeps pace with commercial capability; develops and demonstrates technology to support hardening of microelectronics and photonics to meet DoD's missile and space requirements; and develops materials, processes, layout and design methods to enhance radiation hardness and fabricate and test microelectronics. DTRA also performs EMP vulnerability assessments for national and DoD customers.

Vulnerability Analysis and Protection DTRA developed and updates a fast running facility vulnerability assessment software tool for force protection planning that integrates high fidelity models and supports a wide range of customers including the Combatant Commanders.

Integrated Munitions Effects DTRA developed and continues to update the Integrated Munitions Effects Assessment (IMEA) model that enhances the selection and employment of conventional weapons against fixed targets, including HDBT, and allows consideration of potential collateral effects should WMD be associated with those targets. IMEA permits rapid target characterization, high fidelity environment definition, fast weapon effects calculations, and accurate and accredited results.

WMD Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

DTRA is working to reduce gaps in persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and improve evaluation of potential solutions to fill those gaps.

Survivability and Vulnerability Assessments

DTRA Balanced Survivability Assessment (BSA) Teams conduct mission survivability assessments against a broad spectrum of threats focusing on vital and critical national/theater mission systems. For example, BSAs provide all-hazard assessment capability to support survivability of key facilities and systems supporting USSTRATCOM's missions including Global Command and Control; Space Operations; Global Strike; Countering-WMD; Integrated Missile Defense; Information Operations; ISR; and Strategic Deterrence. In addition, at the tasking of the Joint Staff, DTRA performs Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments that assess facility vulnerability to terrorist operations and means for reducing mass casualties and damage to mission essential capabilities. These assessments include terrorist operations, security operations, structural engineering, infrastructure engineering, CBRNE emergency management, and information assurance.

Chemical-Biological Defense Science and Technology DTRA also participates in the DoD CBDP. The agency executes the S&T portion of that program's RDT&E effort, transitions technologies through R&D, experiments, and demonstrations; maintains a robust technology base by investing in basic research and broadening research opportunities to industry and academia; and answers S&T questions on chemical and biological agents' characteristics and effects. DTRA also manages funding execution for the CBDP's advanced development and procurement effort.

A New DTRA Strategy for the Changing Security Environment

The QDR highlighted new security challenges including external and internal pressures to state fragility, increased global access to dangerous materials due to technological advancements, growth in terrorism, and increasingly complex black market proliferation networks. In response to these challenges, the President's nuclear and biological security initiatives, and QDR guidance, DTRA is embarked upon a new strategy to guide its Countering-WMD efforts. Called "Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation" (NLGC), this strategy provides the model for DTRA support to and participation in global security engagement to prevent, reduce, and respond to WMD threats.

Named after the sponsors of the CTR legislation that created the CTR Program, Former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Senator Dick Lugar (R-IN), NLGC adapts and applies the lessons learned from the execution of the Nunn-Lugar program to the new global security environment. At the core of the strategy is the importance of agile, flexible, anticipatory and responsive programs and activities to meet emerging threats and exploit fleeting opportunities for WMD threat

reduction in cooperation with partners across the globe. NLGC more effectively employs the full range of DTRA and SCC-WMD CWMD capabilities and tools, integrating the CTR program, arms control, bilateral and multilateral threat response activities, global situational awareness, expanded interagency and international partnerships, and increased support to the Combatant Commanders' theater security engagement efforts.

Budget Execution

Before concluding, I would like to express my commitment to the effective and efficient management of the additional funding that DTRA is requesting. First, our past performance indicates that we can effectively and efficiently obligate and expend funding made available to us. Second, we have contracts in place with sufficiently high funding ceilings that will permit the rapid obligation of additional funding, where appropriate. Third, efforts are ongoing to aggressively monitor and refine implementation plans to ensure timely and effective program execution and eliminate any potential obstacles.

Conclusion

In conclusion, countering the threats posed by WMD is a national priority and DTRA and the SCC-WMD fulfill central roles in that effort. We work closely with DoD, interagency, and international partners and customers in all that we do. Our FY11 budget request responds to the QDR calls for increased investment in key CWMD mission areas. Although we are requesting significant budget growth, we believe that we can effectively and efficiently execute the additional funding. I urge your support for the DTRA budget request, thank you again for this opportunity, and look forward to answering your questions.