Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)

Concept of Operations
# Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3  
2.0 Naming Convention ......................................................................................................................... 5  
3.0 Mission ............................................................................................................................................. 5  
4.0 Scope ................................................................................................................................................ 6  
5.0 Responsibilities and Functions ........................................................................................................ 7  
6.0 Levels of Effort (LOE) .................................................................................................................... 10  
7.0 Requisite Authorities ..................................................................................................................... 11  
8.0 Organization ................................................................................................................................... 16  
9.0 Baseline Manning and Funding ..................................................................................................... 17  
10.0 JIDO Value Summary .................................................................................................................... 17  
11.0 Appendices ..................................................................................................................................... 18  
12.0 Glossary ......................................................................................................................................... 25
1.0 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is to describe the mission, scope, responsibilities, functions, and requisite authorities of the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) at the present time and after it transitions to become the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) as of October 1, 2016. While sustaining its current mission, core functions, and levels of support to the Combatant Commands (CCMD), as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD), JIDO will enable rapid tactical responsiveness and anticipates acquisition requirements to prepare for, and react to, battlefield surprise to help meet counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), and other related operational challenges, including counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED).

1.2 Background

The U.S. Army Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force was created in October 2003 to counter the increased IED threat faced by our personnel deployed to Iraq. The success of this group led to a recommendation in 2005 that a larger counter-IED-focused organization be created to meet the ever-increasing need for intelligence support and to counter threat IED technologies, tactics, and methodologies. On January 18, 2006, then-DSD Gordon R. England established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to provide timelier, integrated solutions to the urgent operational needs of our Warfighters. Then, DoD Directive 2000.19E, “Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)” (Reference (a)), established JIEDDO as a Jointly Manned Activity (JMA) operating under the authority, direction, and control of the DSD. Per that Directive, JIEDDO’s mission was to “focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of the Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence.”

On September 6, 2013, as a result of the drawdown of specific contingency operations, the DSD issued the memorandum, “Organizing the DoD to Provide Quick Reaction Capabilities” (Reference (b)). This memorandum directed JIEDDO to continue its mission and maintain essential capabilities commensurate with reducing personnel in accordance with the reduction of supported forces and to submit a resourcing plan consistent with Course of Action (COA) 2A outlined in the Deputy’s Management Advisory Group (DMAG) briefing of July 17, 2013 (Reference (c)).

On November 26, 2013, the DSD issued a follow-on memorandum, “JIEDDO Mission Directive on the Enduring Organizational Concept of Operations” (Reference (d)), which detailed JIEDDO’s role of providing the tactical responsiveness and agility necessary to combat the threat of IEDs. The DSD directed development of a
CONOPS to articulate JIEDDO’s enduring mission to retain the capacity to enable tactical responsiveness, scaled to fiscal realities, and to provide the flexibility to meet increased future requirements. The CONOPS also included recommendations on how JIEDDO would prepare for and react to battlefield and operational surprise in specific operational areas: *counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related operational areas, including counter-improved explosive devices.*

In the fall of 2014, the DSD appointed the office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) to develop a list of alternatives regarding how to realign JIEDDO. The DCMO considered a range of options for the future of JIEDDO and ultimately the decision was made to transition JIEDDO from a jointly manned activity under the DSD to a Defense Agency under the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), in accordance with title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) sections 191 and 193. The DCMO provided its recommendation on March 2, 2015, “Organizational Realignment of the JIEDDO,” (Reference (e)).

On March 11, 2015, the DSD established JIEDDO as a Defense Agency, designated as a Combat Support Agency (Reference (f)), to enable rapid tactical responsiveness and anticipate acquisition requirements to prepare for, and react to, battlefield surprise in support of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related operational areas, including counter-improved explosive device. On April 30, 2015, he then approved the name change from the JIEDDO to the JIDA (Reference (g)).

On November 25, 2015, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, Public Law 114-92, (Section 1532(c)) (Reference (h), was enacted and directed that the Department provide a plan and timeline for the full and complete transition of the activities, functions, and resources of the JIDA to an office under the authority, direction, and control of a Military Department or a Defense Agency in existence as of October 1, 2015.

On February 10, 2016, the Department’s Resource Management Decision (RMD) for the FY 2017 Presidential Budget (PB) (Reference (i)) was submitted, which implemented the DSD decision to rename JIDA as JIDO, directed its organizational realignment from the Army to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and approved the request from the USD(AT&L) to transfer all current JIDA resources from the Services to JIDO within DTRA and under the authority, direction, and control of the Director, DTRA, effective October 1, 2016.
2.0 Naming Convention

Resource Memorandum Decision (RMD) Number 700A2 was approved on February 10, 2016 in support of the Presidential Budget for FY 2017. The RMD specified the name change from the Joint Improvised-Defeat Agency to the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, effective October 1, 2016. For the remainder of this document, references to the “JIDO” should be read to mean both JIDA and JIDO unless a particular aspect of the CONOPS relates solely to the organization in existence prior to October 1, 2016, when the term “JIDA” will be used.

3.0 Mission

JIDO enables Department of Defense actions to counter improvised threats with tactical responsiveness and through anticipatory, rapid acquisition\(^1\) in support of Combatant Commands’ efforts to prepare for, and adapt to, battlefield surprise in support of counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (COIN), and other related mission areas, including counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED).


JIDO supports CT and COIN in accordance with DoD policy and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC). In recognition of CT, COIN, and other C-IED-related functions being supported by various organizations within the Department, JIDO intends to sustain transparency of its activities and investments to the CCMDs, the Military Departments/Services, other Defense agencies and organizations, the Joint Staff, and ASD SO/LIC and its supporting Combatting Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO). This is intended to inform JIDO mission compliance and allow other

\(^1\) Anticipatory acquisition is defined as capability development and delivery when threat activity informs sufficiently a movement of disruptive capabilities into a CCMD Area of Responsibility (AOR) and/or a change in threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TT&P) that could present a threat and gap to U.S. forces in the near term.
organizations to identify where apparent duplication across the Department may exist and where further collaboration may be necessary.

4.0 Scope

JIDO accomplishes its mission by sustaining an advanced information technology and fusion infrastructure that enables a threat awareness and understanding capability; providing expeditionary, forward-deployed operations, intelligence, training, and advisory capabilities with reach-back support; enabling rapid and innovative counter-improvised-threat solution development and delivery; and supporting Military Departments/Services’ pre-deployment training and CCMDs’ priority training-exercise support requirements as requested and validated. For contingency operations surge requirements, JIDO sustains a contractor-services framework that is easily expandable when support requirements are validated and quickly contractible when missions terminate. JIDO’s mission is further enhanced by leveraging broad Communities of Action (CoA) that include DoD, other U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, key coalition allies and partners, and, when appropriate, academia and the private sector, to leverage their capabilities, expertise, access, and authorities to counter threat-networks and their use and facilitation of improvised weapons.
5.0 Responsibilities and Functions

5.1 Core Functions (CF)

Supporting JIDO’s mission are three synchronized CFs.

5.1.1 CF # 1. Assist Situational Understanding (of threat-network activities)

The IED and other disruptive threats represent a continuing and irregular threat for U.S. and coalition forces. By using operational data while embedded with U.S. joint forces, production from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and continuously evolving analytical tools and methodologies, JIDO acquires a deep understanding of current and emergent threat activity focused on supporting threat facilitation networks and their use of improvised weapons. JIDO then delivers consumable assessments and intelligence information to help Warfighters plan for and adapt to rapidly changing conditions supported by close links to reach-back support across the intelligence community and among relevant U.S. departments and agencies. These links make JIDO a unique venue for horizontally integrating and coordinating whole-of–governments’ actions against current, emergent, and improvised threats while rapidly informing counter-improvised threat solutions development and delivery. This function is supported by strong intelligence and acquisition communities’ partnerships.
In a manner similar to actions taken against enemies in the past, addressing these threats requires a doctrinal model to inform our analytical approach and that characterizes the facilitation framework. The doctrinal model also informs how materiel transitions from inert materiel to kinetic weapons. JIDO’s analytic model, “The Cone” (above), informs how JIDO identifies key nodes of the supporting IED and other improvised weapons value chain and network from employment, to trans-shipment, to research and development, and finally to legitimate businesses.

5.1.2 CF # 2. Enable Rapid Capability Delivery (RCD) to Implement DoD Accelerated and Urgent Acquisition Models

JIDO will maintain an embedded presence with deployed U.S. joint forces. In coordination with the Military Service components, this allows JIDO to assist Joint Force Commanders to identify and understand their risks and vulnerabilities, and enables a rapid and early understanding of capability gaps, the timely validation of requirements, and informed investments in counter-threat technologies and non-material solutions within the CCDRs’ latest time of need. With Joint IED Defeat Fund’s (JIEDDF) flexibility and authorities, JIDO initiates, accelerates, develops, and delivers urgent (0-2 years) counter-improvised threat solutions addressing validated CCDR urgent needs to counter disruptive technologies within a two-year timeframe; to accelerate development — “concept-to-prototype” -- enabling a warm start on critical emerging requirements (2-5 years); and to influence counter-threat development efforts in the 5+ year range through coordination with Military Department/Service science and technology.
organizations, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DTRA, and partner nations, and through appropriate vehicles with the national laboratories, academia, and industry.

JIDO uses a threat-based, deliberate, structured, and proactive approach to identify and validate urgent or emergent capability requirements and associated capability gaps, and to acquire rapidly and deliver capability solutions to prevent or mitigate battlefield or operational surprise. JIDO also oversees an open, transparent, internal governance process through which all JIIID mission-related requests are considered for validation which is coordinated with the affected CCMD, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the Military Departments/Services to reduce development and deployment cycle time and ensure transparency.

![JIDO Rapid Capability Delivery Model](image)

The Rapid Capability Delivery (RCD) process begins with rapidly understanding the threat through a forward-embedded tactical presence that accelerates identification of counter-threat gaps for the Warfighter and provides a continuous feedback mechanism for capability improvements. This drives rapid decision-making and leads to the ability to develop and deliver capabilities quickly through appropriate authorities and flexible funding. Once a capability is proven effective, the rapid acquisition process is used to develop further capacity upon approval of an immediate Warfighter need (Urgent Operational Need and Emergent Operational Need – (UON/EON)). In parallel with building capacity for the Warfighter, the Joint Capabilities Integration
Development System (JCIDS) process is then used to ensure awareness of and to fulfill enduring requirements to the U.S. Joint Force and to enable institutionalization of new capabilities.

5.1.3 CF # 3. Enable DoD Responses to Improvised Weapons.

JIDO utilizes and intends to sustain a robust communities of action approach to coordinate with the Military Departments/Services, the Joint Staff, CCMDs, other U.S. departments and agencies, coalition partners, industry, and academia as it develops counter-improvised threat capabilities for deployed or deploying U.S. joint forces. This methodology continuously increases efficiencies by leveraging the authorities, access, and capabilities of the entire U.S. Government and its partners as counter-improvised threat solutions are developed and realized.

6.0 Levels of Effort (LOE).

As a means to prioritize resources properly, JIDO applies three LOE to support a CCDR. JIDO’s core functions are applied across these LOE in a scalable manner based on the threat, the prioritization based on threat-effects on U.S. joint forces, the urgency to the CCMD, and available resourcing. The determination to apply a specific LOE towards a given CCMD is based on where U.S. forces are deployed and where the threat is most predominant.

6.1 LOE # 1. GLOBAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (in Base)

This LOE allows decision-makers to understand the current threat and supporting events within the CCMD AOR that affect CCMD strategies, goals, and objectives both immediately and in the near future. JIDO, in collaboration with the Intelligence Community, other U.S. departments and agencies, the Military Departments/Services, and coalition partners, senses the global operational environment to assist CCMDs to anticipate threats and identify priorities for more detailed analysis and support. JIDO will maintain global situational awareness including continuous monitoring for changes in threat networks; evolving threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and the identification of new, potentially disruptive, threat technologies. JIDO then quickly informs where the current Department counter-improvised threat portfolio poses potential risk to the U.S. joint force. JIDO will also continuously leverage the production of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise for this purpose.
6.2 LOE # 2. REGIONAL-FOCUSED SUPPORT (in Base)

This LOE provides support where threat networks and their improvised weapons are emerging or maturing and/or are having a direct or indirect (supporting) impact on contingency operations and deployed U.S. joint forces. JIDO provides Regional/Focused Support through dedicated, tailored capabilities (materiel and non-materiel) to enhance the situational understanding of threat networks posing the greatest threat or potential threat to U.S. interests; to identify CCMD capability requirements and gaps; and to facilitate timely validation and accelerate development of counter-threat solutions. JIDO provides Regionally Focused Support to CCMDs within resource limitations and in accordance with DoD priorities. This LOE includes rapid prototyping and assessment of technologies to counter the threat. It also fulfills approved and directed CCMD training support requirements for building partner nation capacity.

6.3 LOE # 3. DECISIVE EFFORT – QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY (Surge)

This LOE provides support where U.S. forces are deployed in support of a contingency operation that is contested by threat networks and their use of improvised weapons. In full coordination with the CCMDs and the Joint Staff, JIDO provides comprehensive support to CCMD-validated urgent capability requirements to counter threat networks and the threat’s use of improvised weapons when engaged in a contingency operation. A Surge-Quick Reaction Capability (QRC)/Decisive Effort requires the commitment of the full spectrum of JIDO capabilities and resources to rapidly identify, develop, deliver, and integrate materiel and non-materiel solutions and associated training to meet the CCDR’s timeline. Recognizing the Military Services’ responsibility to train their forces, JIDO training support will be limited to new tools, tactics, and materiel; assistance wherever pre-deployment training support is required and requested by the Military Departments/Services and/or required by the CCMDs; planning and exercise support for CCMD exercises; and fulfillment of approved and directed CCMD training support requirements for building partner nation capacity. Sustainment of this level of effort is dependent on supplemental funding.

7.0 Requisite Authorities

The following authorities are required in the performance of the mission, functions, and capabilities described in this CONOPS. After October 1, 2016, all of the authorities described below will be performed under the authority, direction and control of the Director, DTRA.
7.1 Flexible Funding Authorities

Flexibility and rapid responsiveness depend on the authorities currently included in the JIEDDF, which is an appropriation that can be obligated over a 3-year period and is “colorless”\(^2\). This authority is consistent with Section 1532(c)(2) of the NDAA for FY 2016 to maintain flexibility in facilitating the validation of urgent and emergent capability requirements; analysis of solutions; research and development; and development, production, and fielding of materiel and non-materiel capabilities. The JIDA currently manages and intends to continue management of the JIEDDF or its successor fund.

7.2 Miscellaneous Authorities and Relationships:

Communicate directly with the Heads of the DoD Components and the Joint Staff as necessary to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions, including the transmission of requests for advice and assistance (supporting relationship).

- Communicate directly with the Military Departments. Formal communications with the Military Departments will be transmitted through the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
- Communicate directly with the CCDRs through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff (CJCS) except for those direct communications with the CCDRs relating to routine assistance within assigned responsibilities and functions and established support to contingency operations.
- Communicate directly with the Joint Staff, CCMD J-Directorates, Service Component Commands, Subordinate Unified Commands (SBUs), Joint Task Force Commanders, other U.S. Government officials, representatives of the Legislative Branch, members of the public, industry, and academia as required in furtherance of mission objectives.
- Communicate with representatives of foreign governments or other entities, as appropriate, in carrying out assigned responsibilities and functions in coordination with the CCMD and the supporting U.S. Country Team. Communicate with the National Security Council staff and Executive Branch through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) and the Joint Staff (J5) as required. Communicate with representatives of the Legislative Branch in coordination with the Assistant Secretary

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\(^2\) **Colorless Funding** is an accepted fiscal law term used to describe the Joint IED Defeat Fund. JIEDDF funds can be used to support military personnel, O&M, procurement, RDT&E, and defense working capital funds accounts to investigate, develop, and provide equipment, supplies, services, training, facilitates, personnel, and funds to assist U.S. forces in the defeat of IEDs.
of Defense for Legislative Affairs or the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense, as appropriate and consistent with the DoD legislative program.

- Establish and maintain, for the functions assigned, an appropriate publications system for the promulgation of organization regulations, instructions, and reference documents, and changes thereto, similar to the policies and procedures prescribed in DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Issuances Program” (Reference (j)). Publish advertisements, notices, or proposals in newspapers, magazines, or public periodicals through DTRA.

- Acquire the use of facilities and acquire equipment in accordance with applicable law and DoD policy.

- Enter into and administer contracts, directly or, when JIDO, through a Military Department/Service, a DoD contract administration services component, or other Federal department or agency, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment, and services required to accomplish JIDO mission or, when JIDO, through DTRA, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment, and services required to accomplish JIDO mission.

- Establish and maintain property accounts for JIDO and appoint Boards of Survey, approve reports of survey, relieve personal liability, and drop accountability when authorized and as appropriate, and issue the necessary security regulations for the protection of property.

- Obtain reports, information, advice, and assistance, consistent with DoD Instruction 8910.1, “Information Collection and Reporting” Reference (k), as necessary, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions.

The Director, JIDO, may re-delegate these authorities in writing as determined appropriate, except as otherwise specifically provided herein or as otherwise provided by law or regulation.

### 7.3 Foreign Security Force Training

The Director, JIDO, is authorized to use up to $30 million to provide training to foreign security forces to defeat improvised explosive devices under authority provided to DoD under any provision of law (Sec. 1533 of Public Law No: 114-92).

### 7.4 Intelligence Function Authority

In accordance with USD(I) Supplementary Guidance (Reference (l), JIDO conducts Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) activities. JIDO also gathers, uses, and assembles information, intelligence, and analytical products collected or produced by other activities in support of their mission. JIDO Intelligence
Directorate/Mission Integration Division is the only organization within JIDO with the authority to conduct intelligence-related activities and functions.

7.5 Disruptive Technology Precursor Flow Disruption

This authority is derived from FY13 NDAA, Section 1532 (Reference (m), as amended which extends additional authorities to fund U.S. Government activities designed to disrupt the flow of IED precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan and has authorized up to $15 million for that purpose. JIDO anticipates that this authority, for any precursors and their facilitation, will continue to have applicability in a continuous emerging threat environment.

7.6 Classification Authority.

The Director, JIDO, exercises original classification authority over information and activities of JIDO.

7.7 Foreign Disclosure Authority.

The Director, JIDO, exercises foreign disclosure authority, in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classification Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,” (Reference (n)) over information comprising all programs and activities of JIDO. The DoD Components will coordinate all foreign disclosure decisions potentially restricting or delaying JIDO counter-threat mission.

7.8 Designated Approval Authority.

JIDO operates and manages its own communications networks/systems in direct support of its mission. On behalf of the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), JIDO J6/CIO is the Designated Accrediting Authority for JIDO. This authority assumes responsibility for ensuring operating systems and mission Information Technology (IT) enclaves are managed and operate at acceptable risk levels.

7.9 Support and International Agreements.

JIDO will:

- Develop and enter into agreements with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, consistent with DoD Instruction 4000.19, “Support Agreements” (Reference (o)), in carrying out assigned responsibilities and functions.
Unclassified

- Maintain appropriate liaison with foreign governments and international organizations for the exchange of information on programs and activities in the field of assigned responsibilities to support CCDRs' theater objectives. Communications with foreign governments for the purpose of negotiating and concluding international agreements will be conducted consistent with DoD Directive 5530.3, “International Agreements” (Reference (p)).

- Negotiate and conclude international agreements when granted authority as stated in the previous bullet to support OUSD(AT&L)-related cooperative research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities performed by JIDO with international partners, in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.01, “The Defense Acquisition System” (Reference (q)), and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Chapter 11.2.2. (Reference (r)).

7.10 Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release.

JIDO will exercise clearance authority for public release of official JIDO information and undertake appropriate security and policy review of such information, consistent with DoD Directive 5230.9, “Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release” (Reference (s)).

7.11 Business Relationships (Specific support relationships of JIDO):

JIDO will sustain:

- A supporting relationship to the Warfighter-Senior Integration Group (W-SIG), the CJCS, and each of the CCDRs.
- Coordinating relationships with intelligence agencies as determined appropriate and necessary by the Director, JIDO, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions.
- Coordinating relationships with other U.S. Government departments and agencies regarding planning and implementation of approved programs to collect, exploit, and analyze IED components and other improvised weapons.
8.0 Organization

8.1 JIDO Organizational Model

The following describes the planned organizational model as of October 1, 2016.

JIDO consists of a Director, a Vice Director, a Deputy Director Operations, a Deputy Director Mission Support, and such subordinate organizational elements established by the Director within resources authorized. The Director, through the Vice Director and the Chief of Staff, oversees subordinate Joint Staff Directorates. Joint Staff Directorates are accountable for the performance of their essential staff (internal) and operational (customer external) tasks. Supported by an internal battle rhythm and driven by the needs of the CCMD and Military Departments/Services, Joint Staff Directorates fulfill their duties and report to the Director through the Vice Director and Chief of Staff, who run day-to-day JIDO operations.
9.0 Baseline Manning and Funding

The Presidential Budget for FY 17-22 has been submitted. The supporting Resource Management Decision (RMD) renames the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) as the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO); establishes JIDO base funding; establishes authorized civilian government manpower levels; informs the Services’ military contributions; and approves the request from the USD(AT&L) to transfer all current JIDO resources from the Services to JIDO under the DTRA. In order to sustain JIDO core capabilities and required capacity, additional funding for contract support services will be required.

JIDO manning, supported and authorized through the RMD by the FY 2017 PB (Reference (t)) , is 110 active military personnel and 258 civilian personnel for a total of 368 government personnel.

10.0 JIDO Value Summary

JIDO provides a substantial amount of value to the DoD. It sustains the capability to respond proactively to emergent improvised threat capabilities and facilitates quick response to warfighter needs in contingency operations in support of CCDRs. JIDO is the only DoD organization designed, manned, trained, and equipped to capitalize on the synergy of applying intelligence, flexible funding, rapid capability development and delivery, and the ability to enable U.S. Joint Force preparedness to defeat improvised threats. JIDO:

- Provides the Department an immediate threat and disruptive technology awareness capability where U.S. forces are currently deployed in order to support U.S. Joint Force rapid adaptation (consumable operational or intelligence information and threat-based rapid capability delivery);
- Affords the Department an enduring quick reaction capability (QRC) to enable the Department’s actions to provide rapid capability development and delivery in support of CCMD efforts to defeat threat networks and their improvised threats when valid gaps are identified (materiel, non-materiel);
- Retains the ability to serve as the lead enabling organization to fight improvised explosive device and other emerging battlefield or operational threats; and
- Ensures that follow-on forces are informed on the threat and available counter-improvised threat capabilities (training integration).

JIDO enables tactical responsiveness and anticipates CCMD requirements to enhance force protection, increase tactical force maneuverability, and mitigate battlefield or operational surprise in support of CT, COIN, and other related operational areas, including counter-improvised explosive devices.
11.0 Appendices

11.1 Appendix 1 – Definitions

**Anticipatory Acquisition** - Capability development and delivery when threat activity informs sufficiently a movement of disruptive capabilities into a CCMD Area of Responsibility (AOR) and/or change in threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TT&P) that could present a threat and capability gap to US forces.

**Colorless Funding** is an accepted term used to describe the Joint IED Defeat Fund’s capability to be transferred to any military personnel, O&M, procurement, RDT&E and defense working capital funds account to investigate, develop, and provide equipment, supplies, services, training, facilitates, personnel and funds to assist U.S. forces in the defeat of IEDs. This is in addition to any other transfer authority available to DoD. Additionally, any funds transferred from JIEDDF that are not used can be transferred back into JIEDDF.

**Disruptive Technologies** – Technologies that displace, disrupt, or overturn an established technology or traditional method and practice, causing them to be ineffective or inadequate. These threat technologies can include “governing” or “threat network-enabling improvised weapons” intended to achieve strategic effects against the United States and tactical and operational effects on its forces.

**Improvised Explosive Device** – A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.

**Improvised Threats** – Those supporting threat tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) and devices designed, fielded or employed in any modality of conflict that adversely affect U.S. joint force maneuverability or force protection.

**Quick Reaction Capability** – Quick response to validated urgent or emergent warfighter capability requirements.

**Rapid Response** - Applies to materiel or non-materiel urgent capability delivery, deliverable within 2 years (i.e., prototypes).
### 11.2 Appendix 2 – Enduring CIED Capabilities and Supporting Tasks

JIDO will continuously engage with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) development process as new counter-threat material and non-materiel solutions require institutionalization. The following depicts current enduring counter-IED capabilities and tasks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring CIED Capabilities</th>
<th>Supporting Operational Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify Threat Networks that employ and/or Facilitate IEDs</td>
<td>1. Identify network activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Capture, catalog, and identify IED and component signatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Collect and analyze biometric, forensic, and DOMEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect IEDs and/or IED Components</td>
<td>4. From a safe stand-off distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. While dismounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. While mounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. From the air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Waterborne IEDs (WBIED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Homemade Explosives (HME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent and/or neutralize IEDs</td>
<td>10. Disable IEDs in multiple environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Neutralize/Pre-detonate IEDs while dismounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Neutralize/Pre-detonate IEDs while mounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Neutralize/Pre-detonate IEDs from airborne platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Neutralize/Pre-detonate WBIEDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigate IED Effects</td>
<td>15. Mitigate effects of IED attacks, mounted or dismounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribute IED-related Data across the Community of Interest</td>
<td>16. Fuse C-IED data across the Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Disseminate data to support decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train C-IED Capabilities</td>
<td>18. Train C-IED Capabilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.3 Appendix 3 – Current Organizational Functions

11.3.1 Personal Staff / Special Staff

- JIDO Command Group: Organization command, control, and direction.
- Congressional Affairs: Congress relationship management; appropriations and authorizations.
- Director Studies Group: Director analytical and studies focus group.
- General Counsel: Legal advice and support.
- Internal Review: Advise on controls, areas of risk, and process improvement; compliance with public law reporting requirements.
- Protocol: Official JIDO affairs coordination, event logistics.
- Public Affairs: External messaging; media and public outreach coordination and oversight; historian and graphics support.
- Secretariat, the Joint Staff: Support all administrative functions for the Director, Vice Director, and Chief of Staff.

11.3.2 Comptroller

- JIDO financial management; budget, transactions, records.

11.3.3 Contracting

- Contractor-support manpower and logistics acquisition, records, administration, and management.

11.3.4 Security

- Security support activities; anti-terrorism/force protection, personnel security, physical security, and industrial security.
- Foreign Disclosure Office

11.3.5 J1 / J4

- Personnel action center; government civilian and military personnel management.
- Payroll
- Diversity management.
- Talent development and management.
• Logistics and property management

11.3.6  J2/Mission Integration Division (J2/MID)
• Priority Intelligence Requirements management.
• Threat and threat-risk situational understanding (common intelligence picture).
• CCMD threat prioritization and risk (threat networks, their improvised-threat capabilities, prioritized according to their potential (force protection and maneuverability) risk to U.S. Joint forces.
• Intelligence requests support.
• Intelligence Community (IC) community of action; U.S. Government and coalition partners.
• Intelligence Oversight.

11.3.7  J3
• CCMD counter-threat support requirements determination and prioritization.
• Operations situational understanding (common operational picture).
• Requirements determination and management.
• Counter-improvised threat non-material requirements fulfillment
• Organization operational and campaign planning (J35).
• Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Essential Elements of Friendly Information.
• Mission planning, execution, monitoring.
• Deployment/redeployment management.
• Integrated CCMD support; manpower, equipment, training support.
• Weapons technical intelligence support.
• Mission essential tasks and readiness management and reporting.
• Sensitive activity management and oversight.
• CCMD liaison.

11.3.8  J5
• Planning support; CCMD Theater Cooperation Plans, SecDef-approved EXORDS, top priority contingency plans (Joint Strategic Planning process and Adaptive Planning and Execution System support).
• Communities of Action facilitation and management; industry, academia, U.S. Government departments and agencies, coalition partners, and supported elements.
• International community relationship management (in coordination with OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff J5).
• International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Technology Security, and Foreign Disclosure support (international agreements, engagements, and initiatives).

11.3.9 J6
• Clinger-Cohen, DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) policy compliance.
• Designated Approval Authorities (DAA)/Authorizing Official sustainment.
• Certification, accreditation maintenance.
• Intelligence and information collection (reconnaissance), fusion (integration), analysis, and dissemination.
• Information technology infrastructure support (enterprise and mission); open information and intelligence cloud services sustainment; rapid prototyping, research and development, and outreach.
• Advanced analytical software development and direct mission analytical and simulation team support.
• Information technology community of action; U.S. Government, academia, industry, laboratories, partners.

11.3.10 J7
• JIDO Joint Training Plan management; Joint training support community of action.
• U.S. Services pre-deployment counter-improvised threat training support (CCMD requirements-based).
• CCMD training exercise support.
• Support CCMD operational planning in coordination with JIDO J5.
• Intelligence analytics schoolhouse (internal).

11.3.11 J8
• Counter-improvised threat material requirements fulfillment (testing, evaluations, development, procurement, and delivery) – in accordance with J3 prioritization.
• Rapid acquisition policy and governance.
• Counter-improvised threat lifecycle and portfolio management and oversight.
• Counter-improvised threat capabilities institutionalization in Joint Force.
• Technology outreach communities of action.

11.3.12 J9
• Mission metrics and operational assessments.
Unclassified

- Counter-improvised threat trends information management.
- Data synthesis support, predictive analysis (in support of J2).
- Directed Studies.
- Global IED Data Repository (in coordination with the J2/Mission Integration Division).
11.4 Appendix 4 – References


c) Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) Briefing, July 17, 2013.


l) USD(I) Supplemental Guidance, April 28, 2015.

m) NDAA for 2013, Section 1532


12.0 Glossary

AOR: Area of Responsibility
CCDR: Combatant Commander
CCMD: Combatant Command
CF: Core Function
C-IED: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
CIO: Chief Information Officer
COA: Course of Action
CoA: Community(ies) of Action
COI: Community of Interest
COIC: Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center
CONOPS: Concept of Operations
DAA: Designated Approval Authority
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DMAG: Deputy Management Advisory Group
DoDD: Department of Defense Directive
DSD: Deputy Secretary of Defense
DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
IT: Information Technology
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration Development
JCOE: Joint Center of Excellence
JIDO: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization
JIEDDF: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund
JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
JROCM: Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum
LOE: Level of Effort
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act
O&M: Operations and Maintenance
OCO: Overseas Contingency Operations (Funding)
OUSD(P): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
QRC: Quick Reaction Capability
R&D: Research and Development
RCD: Rapid Capability Development
RDT&E: Research Development Test and Evaluation
RMD: Resource Management Decision:
SBU: Subordinate Unified Commands
TTPs: Tactics Techniques and Procedures
U.S.: United States
UON: Urgent Operational Need
USD(AT&L): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(I): Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USG: U.S. Government
W-SIG: Warfighter Senior Integration Group