Report on the Activities of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

Calendar Year 2013
Certified True and Correct.

APPROVED: 

GARY HART
Chairman
Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

OPR: DTRA J2/5/8R-AC (Advisory Committees and Programs Office)
DATE: January 15, 2014
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CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD

As Chairman of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), I am pleased to present you with this Report on the Activities of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee for Calendar Year 2013 (CY 13). The Committee, tasked from the Office of the Secretary, deliberates independently and unhindered to review critical issues on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) that confront the Department of Defense (DoD). Collectively, the TRAC members bring their expertise to the table to shed light on focus areas and offer actionable recommendations. In this report, you will find a short description of the TRAC, a list of the focus areas examined by the Committee during CY 13, and a summary of the identified issues and the recommendations relating to each issue.

- Gary Hart, Chairman

THREAT REDUCTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972, instituted the TRAC, to provide independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to combating WMD. The TRAC specifically provides advice and recommendations through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) on the following categories:

- Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons.
- Combating weapons of mass destruction to include non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.
- Nuclear deterrence transformation, nuclear material lockdown and accountability.
- Nuclear weapons effects.
- The nexus of counterproliferation and counter WMD terrorism.

The TRAC is composed of eminent authorities in the fields of national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, WMD, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology. The Committee members are appointed by the SecDef, and their appointments are renewed on an annual basis. For the full TRAC charter, see Appendix A. For the current Committee membership, see Appendix B.
UNCLASSIFIED

CY13 FOCUS AREAS

CY 13 focus areas are in part, a continuation of CY12 but further refined to address evolving CWMD priorities.

Table 1. CY13 Focus Areas

| CWMD Strategic Indications & Warning (I&W). | Evaluate capability to monitor global status of WMD-related materials, equipment, and people. Efforts are focused on assessing the Global CWMD Awareness System (GCAS) and the Global Knowledge Management Capability (GKMC) to understand priorities, related programs, interagency engagement, and program implementation. |
| WMD – Elimination. | Review DoD Counter-Proliferation policy with an emphasis on the assessing the Department of the Army and its plans, policies, concepts of operations, training, exercises, personnel, and equipment needed to eliminate and dispose of all WMDs. |
| Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). | Conduct an independent assessment of the U.S. Government’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The review will take into account the changing environment of CTR, including the evolving threat environment, the retirement of Senator Richard Lugar, and the impact of the fiscal environment. The scope should include such topics as: current CTR programs, both within the former Soviet Union and beyond; the application of CTR efforts to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; the legislative framework for CTR; the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies; the intersection of public health and biosecurity; and engagement with partner nations and international organizations. |
| Nuclear Strategic Stability. | In the context of U.S. policy and the possibility of achieving goals of continued reduction of overall numbers of nuclear weapons, evaluate the effects on and contribution to nuclear strategic stability components of the U.S. nuclear force structure and its classes of nuclear delivery systems. |

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN FOCUS AREAS

In order to formulate actionable recommendations, the full committee met three times during the year. The full committee meetings were preceded by twelve preparatory sessions that leveraged specialized expertise to inform the broader TRAC.
### Table 2. Focus Areas Assessment Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CWMD Strategic I&amp;W – Continued CY14</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assessing the Global Combatting WMD Awareness System (GCAS) to determine the development of GCAS as a tool for the Combatant Commands (COCOMs).</td>
<td>• Continue work to define what a strategic I&amp;W capability should consist of and what role or gap the GCAS should fill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Many owners of key data, with limited to no ability to combine traditional with non-traditional (e.g., open source, commercial...) sources.</td>
<td>• Clarify the objectives for GCAS to maintain credibility with customers, stakeholders and funders, and ensure that goals and the level of effort are matched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of understanding of signatures for small or nascent programs, especially if enabled by non-traditional development/processing means.</td>
<td>• Determine how other existing intelligence and proliferation or treaty monitoring assets and capabilities could contribute to the I&amp;W problem set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assets focused on established proliferators; little to no ability to detect early stage acquisition.</td>
<td>• Adapt existing tools from the conventional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) community as it feeds GCAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Include other COCOMs besides STRATCOM in the development process to influence needs and priorities.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WMD Elimination – Continued CY14</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Elimination (SJFHQ-E) manning levels currently do not provide full capacity to support planning and operations.</td>
<td>• Review the current Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combatting WMD (SCC-WMD) and Standing Joint Task Force - Elimination (or potential SJTF-WMD) structure with an eye toward unifying the three commands/agencies under a single commanding three star general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DoD must be able to respond to a range of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Elimination (WMD-E) requirements, but must also recognize what a Joint Force Commander realistically will be able to accomplish.</td>
<td>• Consider amending the current SJTF-E organization making it similar to the organization of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few policies and relationships established to access additional capabilities beyond the joint force.</td>
<td>• Consider the creation of a network warfare Center of Excellence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DoD should prepare for a range of WMD-related contingencies in order to maximize preparedness and minimize surprise.</td>
<td>• Use U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- To shape the environment, all actors must hear clear and consistent messages regarding WMD.
- Working with regional partners will be critical to addressing WMD problems effectively.
- Tight synchronization of political, military, and international efforts is key to success.

(USSOCOM) War-game Center to look at the known, template, or projected WMD storage site.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Issues</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction – Continued CY 14</strong></td>
<td>Continue program to support CTR as a high priority, considering the significant accomplishments and the ever growing needs to counter WMD through cooperation into the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CTR Determination process is cumbersome and lengthy due to statutory restrictions.</td>
<td>Systems Analysis should undertake communicating accomplishments and metrics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The time that it takes to deploy CTR personnel and equipment could hamper effectiveness.</td>
<td>The TRAC will work towards developing vignettes to better tell the story of CTR accomplishments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional changes and budget cuts threaten the future of the program.</td>
<td>Develop a more productive method of engaging the Combatant Commands.</td>
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<tr>
<td>There is a lack of common metrics to determine the effectiveness of CTR programs.</td>
<td>Examine synergy between CTR and emergency response/CWMD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The boundary between public health and CTR biosecurity programs is unclear.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Strategic Stability – Continued CY 14</th>
<th>Research and review will continue with expected recommendations in mid-2014.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The effects on and contribution to nuclear strategic stability of components of the U.S. nuclear force structure and its classes of nuclear delivery systems.</td>
<td>Developments in certain regions will be examined for implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The impact of budget constraints and acquisition decisions impact on reducing or eliminating specific classes of weapon delivery system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The advantages and disadvantages of each class system, individually and as a part of the U.S. nuclear force structure, in promoting strategic stability in steady state and crisis, achieving deterrence goals and reassuring allies.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider the effect of various types of weapons on strategic stability changes if the overall numbers of weapons are reduced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget impacts on modernizing classes of weapons.</td>
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</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS

CWMD Strategic Indications & Warnings

- Continue work to define what a strategic I&W capability should consist of and what role or gap the GCAS should fill.
- Clarify the objectives for GCAS to maintain credibility with customers, stakeholders and funders, and ensure that goals and the level of effort are matched.
- Determine how other existing intelligence and proliferation or treaty monitoring assets and capabilities could contribute to the I&W problem set.
- Adapt existing tools from the conventional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) community as it feeds GCAS.
- Include other COCOMs besides STRATCOM in the development process to influence needs and priorities.

WMD – Elimination

- Review the current Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combatting WMD (SCC-WMD) and Standing Joint Task Force - Elimination (or potential SJTF-WMD) structure with an eye toward unifying the three commands/agencies under a single commanding three star general.
- Consider amending the current SJTF-E organization making it similar to the organization of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).
- Consider the creation of a network warfare Center of Excellence.
- Use U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) War-game Center to look at the known, template, or projected WMD storage site.

Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

- Continue program to support CTR as a high priority, considering the significant accomplishments and the ever growing needs to counter WMD through cooperation into the future.
- Systems Analysis should undertake communicating accomplishments and metrics.
- The TRAC will work towards developing vignettes to better tell the story of CTR accomplishments.
- Develop a more productive method of engaging the Combatant Commands.
- Examine synergy between CTR and emergency response/CWMD.

Nuclear Strategic Stability

- Research and review will continue with expected recommendations in mid-2014.
- Developments in certain regions will be examined for implications.
CONCLUSION

In CY14, the TRAC will continue to focus on the areas mentioned above to develop more concrete recommendations highlighting lessons learned for future scenarios for DoD senior leaders. Additionally, the TRAC will develop new foci to help the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. government implement the most effective policies and capabilities to combat WMD including synergy between CTR and emergency response/CWMD. The TRAC will continue to provide actionable recommendations that align CWMD activities with DoD priorities.
APPENDIX A. CHARTER

CHARTER
THREAT REDUCTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1. Committee’s Official Designation: The Committee shall be known as the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (hereafter referred to as the Committee).

2. Authority: The Secretary of Defense, under the provision of the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (5 U.S.C., Appendix) and 41 CFR § 102-3.50(d), established the Committee.

3. Objectives and Scope of Activities: Weapons of Mass destruction, as set in (4) below.

4. Description of Duties: The Committee shall provide the Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs), independent advice and recommendations on:
   a. Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special weapons;
   b. Combating weapons of mass destruction to include non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management;
   c. Nuclear deterrence transformation; nuclear material lockdown and accountability,
   d. Weapons effects;
   e. The nexus of counterproliferation and counter WMD terrorism, and
   f. Other Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense; and Defense Threat Reduction Agency mission-related matters.

5. Agency or Official to Whom the Committee Reports: The Committee shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.


7. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Staff Years: It is estimated that the annual operating costs, to include travel costs, meeting, and contract support, is approximately $620,000, and 2.0 full-time equivalents (FTE) government employees.
8. **Designated Federal Officer**: The Designated Federal Officer, pursuant to DoD policy, shall be a full-time or permanent part-time DoD employee, and shall be appointed in accordance with established DoD policies and procedures.

In addition, the Designated Federal Officer is required to be in attendance at all committee and subcommittee meetings; however, in the absence of the Designated Federal Officer, the Alternate Designated Federal Officer shall attend the meeting.

9. **Estimated Number and Frequency of Meetings**: The Committee shall meet at the call of the Committee’s Designated Federal Officer, in consultation with the Chairperson. The estimated number of Committee meetings is four per year.

10. **Duration of the Committee**: The need for this advisory function is on a continuing basis. However, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), will review and approve the charter renewal every two years.

11. **Termination Date**: The Committee shall terminate upon completion of its mission or two years from the date this Charter is filed, whichever is sooner, unless the Secretary of Defense extends it.

12. **Committee Membership**: The committee shall be composed of no more than 30 committee members who are eminent authorities in the fields of national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology.

Committee Members are appointed as Special Government Employees by the Secretary of Defense, and shall be renewed by the Secretary of Defense or designate on an annual basis. The Committee members who are not full-time or permanent part-time federal officers or employees, shall be appointed as experts and consultants under the authority of 5 U.S.C. § 3109.

Committee members shall, with the exception of travel and per diem for official travel, serve without compensation, unless otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs) shall select the Committee’s Chairperson and Vice Chairperson from the Committee membership at large.

13. **Subcommittees**: With DoD approval, the Committee shall be authorized to establish subcommittees and panels, as required and consistent with its mission, and these subcommittees and panels shall operate under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (5 U.S.C. § 552b, as amended), and other appropriate Federal regulations.

Such subcommittees or panels shall not work independently of the chartered Committee, and shall report their findings and advice solely to the Committee for full deliberation and discussion. Subcommittees or panels have no authority to make decisions and
recommendations verbally or in writing on behalf of the chartered Committee, nor can they report directly or release documents to the Agency or any Federal officers or employees who are not Committee Members.

14. **Recordkeeping:** The records of the Committee and its subcommittees shall be handled according to section 2, General Records Schedule 26 and appropriate Department of Defense policies and procedures. These records shall be available for public inspection and copying, subject to the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (U.S.C. § 552, as amended).

15. **Charter Filed:** May 30, 2012
APPENDIX B. CURRENT MEMBERS
(as of 31 Dec 2013)

Senator Gary W. Hart (Ret.) – Chairman
Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, II – Vice Chairman
MG Donna F. Barbisch, USA (Ret.)
Hon. Joseph A. Benkert
RADM Kenneth Bernard (Ret.)
Hon. Richard A. Falkenrath
Dr. Gigi K. Gronvall
Dr. Gwendolyn M. Hall
Amb. Reno L. Harnish
Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker

Ms. Jill M. Hruby
Dr. Miriam E. John
Amb. Robert G. Joseph
Dr. Robert P. Kadlec
LTG Francis H. Kearney III, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Susan J. Koch
Hon. Michael Nacht
Dr. John F. Reichart
Dr. Jeffrey M. Starr
Ms. Eileen S. Vergino

* Dr. Ernie Moniz (* served part of CY 13)