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# **Annual Report**

Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

*2016*

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This is a report of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC).

The TRAC is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense or any other entity of the United States Government. The report was cleared for open publication by the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review on February 2, 2017.

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.



January 31, 2017

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS**

SUBJECT: 2016 Annual Report, Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

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This memorandum formally transmits the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee's Annual Report for calendar year 2016 detailing activities and recommendations to the Department of Defense. This report contains the following: Threat Reduction Advisory Committee 2016 in Review; 2017 Forecast; and summaries of studies on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, North Korea, China, and Russia.

Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, II  
Chair  
Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

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# Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

## 2016 Annual Report

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## CHAIR'S FOREWORD

As Chairman of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), I am pleased to provide the 2016 Annual Report. The TRAC is tasked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and deliberates independently and unhindered to review critical combating weapons of mass destruction issues that confront the Department of Defense (DoD). Collectively, TRAC members bring in-depth expertise and actionable recommendations on issues of concern for DoD. This report includes a short synopsis of the TRAC, a list of the focus areas the Committee was asked to examine, and a summary of the identified issues and subsequent recommendations.

- *Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, II, Chair*

## PURPOSE AND MISSION

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972, established the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) to provide independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). Eminent authorities in fields as varied as national security, nuclear physics, chemistry, biology, special operations, and public health are appointed for four-year terms subject to annual renewal by the SECDEF. Together the members provide advice and recommendations through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) on the following topics:

- Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons
- Combating weapons of mass destruction to include non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management
- Nuclear deterrence transformation, nuclear material lockdown and accountability
- Nuclear weapons effects
- The nexus of counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction terrorism

For the full TRAC charter, see Annex A. For the current Committee membership, see Annex B.

## TRAC 2016 IN REVIEW

### Membership

In 2015, the SECDEF approved an increase in membership from 20 to 25 consultants. At the end of 2016, the TRAC had 18 members. The Committee gained two new members, Dr. Joseph Braddock and the Honorable (HON) Michael Leiter. Dr. Braddock is a distinguished nuclear physicist and is widely recognized for his contributions in national security and information technology. HON Leiter brings a wealth of expertise in counterterrorism and cyber issues. Four experts have been proposed as new members and are in the process of confirmation. In 2016, the TRAC also saw the departure of four esteemed CWMD experts: HON Graham Allison, Ms. Mary Alice Hayward, Ms. Jill Hruby, and AMB Robert Joseph. Dr. John Reichart will be rotating off the TRAC by spring 2017.



## Plenary Meetings

The TRAC held three Plenary sessions in 2016: May 5-6; September 29-30; and November 16-17. The May Plenary focused broadly on global WMD threats with particular regard to North Korea, China, and Russia. The TRAC outbriefed USD(AT&L) and other senior leaders on the findings of the Future Challenges for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Study at the conclusion of the May Plenary. They also took the opportunity to update and receive guidance from USD(AT&L) on their ongoing studies on North Korea, China, and Russia. The September Plenary addressed emerging biological threats, the Red Blue Theory of Deterrence, and cross-domain issues, among other topics. The TRAC briefed the Deputy Secretary of Defense and USD(AT&L) on the preliminary findings on the Russian Offensive and Defensive Developments, and Implications for U.S. Strategy, Policy, and Capabilities, as well as the study on Chinese WMD Operations. The November Plenary was held at United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Day one focused on providing USSOCOM senior leaders with a thorough understanding of the TRAC, its mission, members, and observations from past and ongoing studies. The TRAC also reviewed the findings from the Russia Study and voted unanimously to approve the recommendations. Day two entailed senior leaders from USSOCOM briefing the TRAC on USSOCOM's mission and the status of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) change of responsibility from United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to USSOCOM. Together, the year's meetings provided invaluable insights and critical forums for discussing and developing the TRAC's recommendations to OSD.

## Focus Areas

The TRAC conducted four study efforts in 2016 as directed by USD(AT&L). The Future Challenges for DTRA Study and the CWMD: A Case Study of North Korea effort were continued from the previous year. The Chinese CWMD Operations Study and Russian Offensive and Defensive Developments, and Implications for United States (U.S.) Strategy, Policy, and Capabilities Study were tasked to the TRAC by USD(AT&L) in February of 2016.

The Future Challenges for DTRA Study concluded information gathering in April 2016. The preliminary work involved discussions with leadership from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), DTRA, USSTRATCOM, the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization, key DoD offices, and the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The team drafted observations for presentation to the full Committee and deliberated final recommendations at the May Plenary. Task Leads briefed USD(AT&L) on the consensus-backed outcome at the conclusion of the Plenary on May 6, 2016. ASD(NCB) and DTRA were briefed separately in June. A summary of the DTRA Study can be found on page 5 of this report.

Countering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s WMD program is a top DoD priority and the TRAC was directed by USD(AT&L) to examine the implications from recent technological advancements by the North Koreans for the United States and its allies in the region. Towards this effort, the DPRK Study Team was briefed by the Department of State (DoS),

National Defense University (NDU), RAND Corporation, the Intelligence Community, the Joint Staff, USSOCOM, and numerous offices in DoD. The team also held meetings at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. The TRAC presented observations and preliminary recommendations to the full Committee at the September Plenary and those were approved by the TRAC. The findings remain classified, but address the potential issues for WMD elimination in the DPRK.

The China Study Team began its research by holding meetings with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) regional desks, the Intelligence Community, the National Academy of Sciences, NDU, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as well as other key stakeholders. The team then travelled to USPACOM and USFK for high-level meetings with U.S. and South Korean officials. The China Team presented preliminary observations at the September Plenary. This team plans to hold additional meetings and will complete its research in early 2017.

The Russia Study Team conducted an ambitious and thorough research effort over the course of 2016 at the direction of USD(AT&L). It was directed to undertake the Russian Offensive and Defensive Developments, and Implications for U.S. Strategy, Policy and Capabilities Study. Throughout 2016, the team met with the Intelligence Community and key DoD offices. The team also travelled to Europe for high-level meetings with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), USEUCOM, and the British Ministry of Defense. The preliminary findings were presented to the full TRAC in November 2016 and unanimously approved. Additional details of this study can be found beginning on page 11.

## THE YEAR AHEAD: 2017 FORECAST

In 2017, the TRAC will fully leverage incumbents and new members with the expertise to handle complex CWMD issues facing DoD. The Committee will engage with USSOCOM on issues affecting implementation of the UCP CWMD mission in accordance with the recently signed terms of reference. In addition, the TRAC will provide reach-back support as directed by USD(AT&L) on CWMD issues affecting the Command based on a recent Memorandum of Agreement between the USD(AT&L) and the Commander, USSOCOM. The Russia Study will be briefed to the new Administration at an appropriate time pursuant to the Deputy Secretary's request. The TRAC's written report from the Russia Study will also be provided to DoD stakeholders. The DPRK Study Team will finalize its report and socialize the findings with the new DoD leadership. The China Study Team will brief the full TRAC at the May Plenary on its preliminary findings and observations. The TRAC plans to begin working on three new efforts directed by USD(AT&L). These include: Development of a Nuclear Deterrent and Related Issues; a Study of the Unified Command Plan CWMD Mission Transfer to USSOCOM; and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Developments.

## FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY STUDY

### TIMELINE, STATUS, AND MEMBERSHIP

Authorization Date:	October 15, 2015
Status:	Finalizing Report
Task Leads:	Dr. Miriam John and AMB Robert Joseph
Members:	Dr. Gigi Gronvall HON Susan Koch VADM Robert Harward, USN, Retired Dr. John Reichart Ms. Mary Alice Hayward

### CONTEXT

As the nation's primary CWMD Agency, DTRA faces many challenges that pull the Agency's mission and resources in numerous directions. Factors such as the growing demand for the real-time support and attendant budgetary pressures make it increasingly difficult for Agency leadership to anticipate and prepare for the future environment. In addition, the UCP transfer of the CWMD mission from USSTRATCOM to USSOCOM may result in major changes for DTRA. The TRAC report will address how DTRA can maximize response capacity to emerging challenges and best assist Combatant Commands in CWMD management, while maintaining a long-term strategic plan for defeating future threats.

### TASKS

As tasked by USD(AT&L) on October 15, 2015, the TRAC is examining:

- Trends, emerging threats, and potential "surprises" that may present new challenges and capability needs, and how DTRA can best stay focused going forward
- The adequacy of DTRA's research and development (R&D) and combat support programs
- The appropriate balance among operational readiness, combat support and R&D, and how to maximize the benefits each can derive from the others

- The effectiveness and adequacy of DTRA's relationships within DoD, especially with the Services and Combatant Commanders, as well as the Agency's relationships within the broader national security community to strengthen the cadre of CWMD expertise
- Lessons learned from USSTRATCOM's CWMD management for use moving forward with the transfer of the CWMD mission to USSOCOM

## **PROGRESS**

The Study Team met eight times to review information on the management and organizational matters specific to the CWMD mission. The Team also met with technical experts from across DoD. The Study Team briefed its findings to the TRAC for deliberation and recommendations at the May Plenary. The TRAC will draft a report by early 2017.

## **FINDINGS**

- DTRA is facing a growing "demand signal" as attention to CWMD is re-energized with the UCP shift of mission responsibility to SOCOM and with DoD's renewed attention to nuclear deterrence
- The TRAC recognized that neither DTRA nor the UCP change will address some key issues surrounding DoD's posture for the CWMD mission

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The TRAC made recommendations related to the DTRA Futures Study that include the following:

- DTRA leadership should reassess and/or redirect several key programs, especially Cooperative Threat Reduction and its R&D portfolio. DTRA should also stand up a "Global WMD Futures Office" with a charter to conduct scenario planning and systems analysis to help guide the Agency's future activities and investments
- To ensure that the CWMD mission set is given the necessary attention and priority across the Department, the SECDEF should establish a parallel structure to the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council
- In addition, SECDEF should establish the DTRA Director as a 3-star general officer billet with a civilian subject matter expert deputy in the next iteration of leadership

# COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF NORTH KOREA

## TIMELINE, STATUS, AND MEMBERSHIP

Authorization Date:	October 15, 2015
Status:	Finalizing Written Report
Task Leads:	HON Michael Nacht and Ms. Eileen Vergino
Members:	HON Joseph Benkert Dr. Miriam John VADM Robert Harward, USN, Retired Dr. Jeffrey Starr LTG Francis Kearney, USA, Retired

## CONTEXT

Countering DPRK's WMD program is a top DoD priority. Recent technological advancements, coupled with DPRK's increasingly hostile rhetoric and actions towards the U.S. and its allies, pose a grave threat, not only to the United States and its allies but to the order of international stability. The TRAC report will address DoD's enduring counter-proliferation and WMD elimination missions, mission readiness, and coordination with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to include roles, responsibilities and capabilities in the coming years, among the military services, DTRA, USSTRATCOM, USPACOM, USFK, the ROK, and other partners.

## TASKS

As tasked by USD(AT&L) in the Terms of Reference dated October 15, 2015, the TRAC is evaluating the following:

- Lessons learned from the Syria chemical weapons destruction which might pertain to the DPRK situation
- The capabilities DoD needs for a DPRK WMD scenario, and how DoD can drive WMD elimination requirements
- The roles, authorities, and synchronization required of key players in planning, training, and equipping

- ROK's role in planning and preparations
- ROK's evolving assumptions with regard to DPRK and how this factors into U.S. Government plans
- The best means of countering and securing the WMD threat in North Korea

## **PROGRESS**

The Study Team began its research in October 2015. The Team met three times in 2016 for briefings from DTRA, USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, NDU, DoS, RAND Corporation, USFK, U.S. Embassy Seoul, USPACOM, and non-governmental experts in South Korea. The findings and recommendations were presented at the September 2017 Plenary and deliberated on by the full TRAC.

## **FINDINGS**

The classified findings were briefed at the TRAC Plenary and outbriefed to Deputy Secretary of Defense and USD(AT&L) in September 2016.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The TRAC's recommendation on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of North Korea will be published in 2017.

## CHINESE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OPERATIONS

### TIMELINE, STATUS, AND MEMBERSHIP

Authorization Date:	February 16, 2016
Status:	In Progress
Task Leads:	HON Joseph Benkert and Dr. Melissa Choi
Members:	Ms. Donna Gregg Dr. Gigi Gronvall VADM Robert Harward, USN, Retired Ms. Jill Hruby Dr. Miriam John HON Michael Leiter HON Michael Nacht Ms. Eileen Vergino Dr. George Whitesides

### CONTEXT

In recent years nuclear weapons have become a significant component of Chinese military capability and a larger component of their political strategy. The ability to maintain a robust nuclear capability is critical for the United States to maintain strategic balance with China and provide assurances to our allies in the Asia – Pacific region. China's recent provocations and activities highlight the importance of assessing these issues for senior DoD leadership.

### TASKS

As tasked by USD(AT&L) in the Terms of Reference dated February 16, 2016, the TRAC is evaluating the following:

- China's current nuclear strategy and use doctrine, including nuclear and non-nuclear force integration and command and control authorities
- China's nuclear modernization of both strategic and theater forces and the roles these systems play in their strategy and doctrine

- China's preparedness to implement its doctrine, including the perceived influence of U.S. nuclear posture
- China's cooperation with other countries on nuclear issues, especially Russia
- China's assessments of U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific
- Impact of recent provocations and actions in the South China Sea
- U.S. capabilities related to holding Chinese modernized and new systems at risk
- Implications of actual and projected Chinese nuclear posture for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture

## **PROGRESS**

The Study Team began information gathering in March of 2016. Throughout the year the team met with representatives from the OUSD(P) regional desks, the Intelligence Community, the Strategic Capabilities Office, the National Academy of Sciences, NDU, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and key DoD offices. In June, the team met with USFK, U.S. Embassy Seoul, USPACOM, government experts from the Pentagon, and non-governmental experts in South Korea in conjunction with the DPRK Study Team. It will deliver recommendations to the new Administration in the spring of 2017.

## **PRELIMINARY FINDINGS**

Information gathering has neared completion. Classified preliminary findings are to be briefed at the 2017 Plenary meeting.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The TRAC expects to brief DoD leadership in early spring 2017 and publish recommendations shortly thereafter.



# RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY, POLICY, AND CAPABILITIES

## TIMELINE, STATUS, AND MEMBERSHIP

Authorization Date:	February 16, 2016
Status:	Awaiting Final Security Approval
Task Leads:	HON Susan Koch and Dr. John Reichart
Members:	HON Joseph Benkert RADM Kenneth Bernard, USPHS, Retired Dr. Joseph Braddock HON Richard Falkenrath Ms. Mary Alice Hayward LTG Francis Kearney, USA, Retired AMB Ronald Lehman, II Ms. Joan Rohlfing Dr. Jeffrey Starr

## CONTEXT

The United States now faces serious political challenges and military dangers from the Russian Federation, which increasingly expresses hostility toward the United States and its allies. Russia is expanding military capabilities to achieve its political objectives through means ranging from coercive diplomacy to hybrid warfare to full military engagement with the West. These challenges will require major changes in how the United States approaches the Russian Federation, including new thinking about deterrence and arms control, and attendant improvements in U.S. deterrence and defense capabilities.

## TASKS

As tasked by USD(AT&L) in the Terms of Reference dated February 16, 2016, the TRAC evaluated the following:

- Current Russian nuclear strategy and use doctrine

- Modernization of Russian strategic and theater nuclear forces
- Russian preparedness to implement its doctrine
- Russian assessments of U.S. military capabilities
- Implications of actual and projected Russian nuclear posture for overall U.S. nuclear strategy and posture, including recommendations for the next Nuclear Posture Review

## **PROGRESS**

During 2016, the Study Team held six meetings with top government and non-government subject matter experts. In September, the group travelled to Europe to meet with staff from the U.S. Mission to NATO, USEUCOM, British Ministry of Defense, and the UK's King's College. The Team's findings and recommendations were deliberated on and subsequently approved by the full TRAC during the November Plenary. The final report has been written and is currently being reviewed by various OSD offices prior to release.

## **FINDINGS**

- Russia is now, and is likely to remain, expansionist in its immediate region and a threat to the United States and NATO
- Integral to Russian strategy and doctrine are modernized strategic and nuclear weapons and innovative, agile conventional and unconventional operations, including space and cyber warfare
- Despite economic problems, Russia has developed new land-based, sea-based, and air-delivered strategic systems and diverse theater and shorter-range systems including several types of ballistic and cruise missiles
- In the same period, the United States and NATO sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and delayed modernization of nuclear deterrent forces. Capabilities underpinning nuclear forces – including human capital devoted to nuclear weapons, strategy, planning, and operations – did not keep pace with the changing security environment
- These circumstances could increase the risk of dangerous Russian miscalculation, and failure of extended or strategic deterrence

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Establish strategic and extended deterrence as priorities of U.S. nuclear policy, strategy and capability

- Undertake an in-depth, detailed analysis of the requirements for deterring Russia and reassuring Allies in the current environment, which differs in important ways from the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as WMD, cyber, and space threats advance and spread
- Pending that work, the United States should not change current nuclear alert levels or declaratory policy nor delay nuclear force modernization
- Work to strengthen the entire talent pool on nuclear weapons and on Russia – covering technology, science, intelligence, policy, strategy, and military planning and operations
- Work to strengthen non-nuclear requirements for deterrence – e.g., cyber, space, economic tools, critical infrastructure, and missile defense – which are also critical

## CONCLUSION

In 2016, the TRAC provided valuable recommendations on issues related to Future Challenges for DTRA; CWMD: A Case Study of North Korea; and Russian Offensive and Defensive Developments, and Implications for U.S. Strategy, Policy and Capabilities. Going into 2017, the TRAC will finalize its recommendations concerning Chinese WMD Operations and will begin in earnest working efforts directed by USD(AT&L) to include: Development of a Nuclear Deterrent and Related Issues; the Study of UCP CWMD Mission Transfer to USSOCOM; and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Developments. The Committee also looks forward to furthering the relationship established in 2016 with USSOCOM to help ensure it has the expertise and resources necessary to incorporate CWMD into the special operations mission.

The TRAC will move to complete the process of bringing new members on board to round out its base of subject matter expertise.

## ANNEX A: TRAC Charter

1. Committee's Official Designation: The Committee shall be known as the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee ("the Committee").

2. Authority: The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 (5 U.S.C., Appendix, as amended) and 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.50(d), established this discretionary Committee.

3. Objectives and Scope of Activities: The Committee shall provide independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as set forth in paragraph 4 below.

4. Description of Duties: The Committee shall provide the Secretary of Defense, and the deputy Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)), independent advice and recommendations on:

- Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons;
- Combating WMD to include non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management;
- Nuclear deterrence transformation, nuclear material lockdown and accountability;
- Nuclear weapons effects;
- The nexus of counterproliferation and counter WMD terrorism; and
- Other AT&L, NCB, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) mission-related matters, as requested by the USD(AT&L)

5. Agency or Official to Whom the Committee Reports: The Committee shall report to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L), pursuant to Department of Defense (DoD) policies and procedures, may act upon the Committee's advice and recommendations.

6. Support: The DoD, through the Office of the USD(AT&L), the Office of the ASD(NCB) Defense Programs, and DTRA, shall provide support, as deemed necessary, for the Committee's performance, and shall ensure compliance with the requirements of the FACA, the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (5 U.S.C. § 552b, as amended) ("the Sunshine Act"), governing Federal statutes and regulations, and established DoD policies and procedures.

7. Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Staff Years: The estimated annual operating cost, to include travel, meetings, and contract support, is approximately \$758,000. The estimated annual personnel costs to the DoD are 1.65 full-time equivalents.

8. Designated Federal Officer: The Committee's Designated Federal Officer (DFO), pursuant to DoD policy, shall be a full-time or permanent part-time DoD employee, designated in accordance with established DoD policies and procedures.

The Committee's DFO is required to be in attendance at all Committee and subcommittee meetings for the entire duration of each and every meeting. However, in the absence of the Committee's DFO, a properly approved Alternate DFO, duly designated to the Committee, according to the DoD policies and procedures, will attend the entire duration of the Committee or subcommittee meetings.

The DFO, or the Alternate DFO, shall open all of the Committee's and subcommittee's meetings; prepare and approve all meeting agendas; and adjourn any meeting when the DFO, or the Alternate DFO, determines adjournment to be in the public interest or required by governing regulations or DoD policies and procedures.

9. Estimated Number and Frequency of Meetings: The Committee shall meet at the call of the Committee's DFO, in consultation with the Committee's Chair. The estimated number of Committee meetings is four per year.

10. Duration of the Committee: The need for this advisory function is on a continuing basis; however, it is subject to renewal every two years.

11. Termination Date: The Committee shall terminate upon completion of its mission or two years from the date this charter is filed, whichever is sooner, unless the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense renews its charter.

12. Membership and Designation: The Committee shall be composed of no more than 25 members who are eminent authorities in the fields of national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, WMD, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology.

The appointment of Committee members will be authorized by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and administratively certified by the USD(AT&L), for a term of service of one-to-four years, with annual renewals, in accordance with DoD policies and procedures. Members of the Committee who are not full-time or permanent part-time Federal officers or employees will be appointed as experts or consultants pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3109 to serve as special government employee (SGE) members. Committee members who are full-time or permanent part-time Federal officers or employees will be appointed pursuant to 41 C.F.R. §102-3.130(a) to serve as regular government employee (RGE) members. No member, unless

authorized by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, may serve more than two consecutive terms of service on the Committee, to include its subcommittees, or serve on more than two DoD federal advisory committees at one time.

The USD(AT&L) has the delegated authority to appoint the Committee's chair and vice chair from among the membership previously appointed according to DoD policies and procedures and, in doing so, will determine the term of service for each, which will not exceed the member's approved term of service.

Each member is appointed to provide advice on behalf of the Government on the basis of his or her best judgment without representing any particular point of view and in a manner that is free from conflict of interest.

Committee members shall, with the exception of reimbursement for official Committee-related travel and per diem, serve without compensation.

**13. Subcommittees:** The DoD, when necessary and consistent with the Committee's mission and DoD policies and procedures, may establish subcommittees, task forces, or working groups to support the Committee. Establishment of subcommittees will be based upon written determination, to include terms of reference, by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the USD(AT&L), as the DoD Sponsor.

Such subcommittees shall not work independently of the Committee and shall report their recommendations and advice solely to the Committee for full deliberation and discussion. Subcommittees, task forces, or working groups have no authority to make decisions and recommendations, verbally or in writing, on behalf of the Committee. No subcommittee or any of its members can update or report, verbally or in writing, directly to the DoD or any Federal officers or employees. If a majority of Committee members are appointed to a particular subcommittee, then that subcommittee may be required to operate pursuant to the same notice and openness requirements of FACA which govern the Committee's operations.

Pursuant to Secretary of Defense policy, the USD(AT&L) is authorized to administratively certify the appointment of subcommittee members if the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has previously authorized the individual's appointment to the Committee or another DoD advisory committee. If this prior authorization has not occurred, then the individual's subcommittee appointment must first be authorized by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense and subsequently administratively certified by the USD(AT&L).

Subcommittee members will be appointed for a term of service or one-to-four years, subject to annual renewals; however, no member shall serve more than two consecutive terms of service on the subcommittee. Subcommittee members, if not full-time or permanent part-time Federal officers or employees, will be appointed as experts or consultants pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3109 to serve as SGE members. Subcommittee members who are full-time or permanent part-time

Federal officers or employees will be appointed pursuant to 41 C.F.R. §102-3.130(a) to serve as RGE members.

The USD(AT&L) has the delegated authority to appoint the chair and vice chair of any appropriately approved subcommittees from among the subcommittee membership previously appointed according to DoD policies and procedures and, in doing so, will determine the term of service for each, which will not exceed the subcommittee member's approved term of service.

Each subcommittee member is appointed to provide advice on behalf of the Government on the basis of his or her best judgment without representing any particular point of view and in a manner that is free from conflict of interest.

With the exception of reimbursement for travel and per diem as it pertains to official travel related to the Committee or its subcommittees, Committee subcommittee members shall serve without compensation.

All subcommittees operate under the provisions of the FACA, the Sunshine Act, governing Federal statutes and regulations, and established DoD policies and procedures.

14. Recordkeeping: The records of the Committee and its subcommittees shall be managed in accordance with General Records Schedule 6.2, Federal Advisory Committee Records, or other approved agency records disposition schedule, and the appropriate DoD policies and procedures. These records shall be available for public inspection and copying, subject to the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (U.S.C. § 552, as amended).

15. Filing Date: May 31, 2016



## ANNEX B: Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Membership

### Chairperson

Ambassador Ronald Lehman, II

### Vice-Chairperson

Dr. Miriam John

### Members

Honorable Graham Allison*	Ambassador Robert Joseph*
Honorable Joseph Benkert	Lieutenant General Francis Kearney, III, USA, Retired
Rear Admiral Kenneth Bernard, USPHS, Retired	Honorable Susan Koch
Dr. Joseph Braddock	Honorable Michael Leiter
Dr. Melissa Choi	Honorable Michael Nacht
Honorable Richard Falkenrath	Dr. John Reichart
Ms. Donna Gregg	Ms. Joan Rohlfing
Dr. Gigi Gronvall	Dr. Jeffrey Starr
Vice Admiral Robert Harward, USN, Retired	Ms. Eileen Vergino
Ms. Mary Alice Hayward*	Dr. George Whitesides
Ms. Jill Hruby*	

\*Terms of Service completed effective: December 31, 2016

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## ANNEX C: TRAC Staff

Mr. William P. Hostyn, Director, (703) 767-4453, [william.p.hostyn.civ@mail.mil](mailto:william.p.hostyn.civ@mail.mil)\*

Mr. Stephen J. Polchek, Deputy Director, (703) 767-8891, [stephen.j.polchek.civ@mail.mil](mailto:stephen.j.polchek.civ@mail.mil)\*

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