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Report on the Activities of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

Calendar Year 2014
UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THREAT REDUCTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Calendar Year 2014 Report of Activities

December 31, 2014

Certified True and Correct.

APPROVED:

Ronald Lehman
Chairman
Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

OPR: DTRA J2/5/8R-AC (Advisory Committees and Programs Office)
DATE: December 31, 2014
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The Secretary of Defense, under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972, established the TRAC to provide independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to CWMD. The TRAC provides advice and recommendations through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)) on the following categories:

- Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons.
- Combating weapons of mass destruction to include non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.
- Nuclear deterrence transformation, nuclear material lockdown and accountability.
- Nuclear weapons effects.
- The nexus of counterproliferation and counter WMD terrorism.

The TRAC is composed of eminent authorities in the fields of national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, WMD, nuclear physics, chemistry, biology, and public health. The Committee members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense and the appointments are renewed on an annual basis. For the full TRAC charter, see Appendix A. For the current Committee membership, see Appendix B.
Calendar Year 2014 FOCUS AREAS

In 2014, the TRAC focus areas included the continuation of the Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and Nuclear Strategic Stability study as well as new issues to include the Chemical Biological Defense Program and Global Health Security Agenda.

Table 1. CY14 Focus Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP)</td>
<td>Review the organizational options for the Chemical Biological Defense Program based upon DoD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) preliminary research and findings. The TRAC should consult with CAPE, the program’s executive agent, and key stakeholders involved in the program. Following consultations, the TRAC will assess the proposed CAPE options and provide the findings to AT&amp;L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)</td>
<td>Conduct an independent assessment of the U.S. Government’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The review will take into account the changing environment of CTR, including the evolving threat environment, and the impact of fiscal constraints. The scope should include such topics as: current CTR programs, both within the former Soviet Union and beyond; the application of CTR efforts to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; the legislative framework for CTR; the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies; the intersection of public health and biosecurity; and engagement with partner nations and international organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)</td>
<td>DoD is a key player supporting the objectives outlined in the GHSA. As such, the TRAC is exploring the roles and benefits for DoD participation in this area. In addition, TRAC will identify the GHSA network within DoD and will explore new technology investments that should be considered in order to increase security against identified or potential threats. The TRAC will also examine the Ebola crisis and the DoD response as a case study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Strategic Stability (NSS)</td>
<td>In the context of U.S. policy and the possibility of achieving goals of continued reduction in overall numbers of nuclear weapons, evaluate the effects on and contribution to nuclear strategic stability components of the U.S. nuclear force structure and its classes of nuclear delivery systems.</td>
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</table>
TRAC FOCUS AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to formulate actionable recommendations, the full Committee met three times during the year in plenary sessions. The plenary meetings were preceded by eighteen preparatory sessions that leveraged specialized expertise to inform the broader TRAC.

Table 2. Focus Areas and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Biological Defense Program</td>
<td>Do not reorganize the Program at this time; address root cause issues instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE’s proposed reorganization will not address root causes of program’s inefficiencies and weak effectiveness.</td>
<td>AT&amp;L/NCB direct a major revision of DoDD 5160.05E to simplify roles and responsibilities and reduce ambiguities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current overlap of authorities represents a barrier to success.</td>
<td>AT&amp;L/NCB direct all program elements to assess and reduce personnel requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program currently employs at least twice as many people as other programs of comparable size.</td>
<td>Army continue as Executive Agent and strengthen its leadership over concept for operations (CONOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedure (TTP) development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build is unique within the organization and enormously time consuming, but JRO implementing process improvements.</td>
<td>Formalize the translational teams between JSTO and Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions within the program exist over the current funding balance between chemical and biological threats and well as medical and non-medical solutions. However, both CAPE and TRAC found the balances to be about right.</td>
<td>JSTO and JPEO provide modest level of core support to intramural labs comparable to Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to sustain SMEs and facilities, and also guidance on areas that will be competed or phased out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither the Joint Staff Technology Office (JSTO) nor the Army believes they are responsible for stewardship of the intramural labs.</td>
<td>Create an independent review process that is chartered to provide a “report card” on progress. TRAC to review progress in the Spring of 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous studies have identified similar problems with the program but the program has not been held accountable for changes.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>• As CTR expands beyond the former Soviet Union, relationships are becoming more multidimensional.</td>
<td>• Better align CTR within US Government to ensure contribution to crisis response and to sustain capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The international environment is more difficult; semi-permissive and/or non-permissive environments are increasingly likely.</td>
<td>• Prepare for less than permissive environments, surprises and new/evolving threats through contingency/scenario based planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The CTR determination process is cumbersome and lengthy due to statutory restrictions and self-imposed requirements.</td>
<td>• Include CTR in the planning process for crisis response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The time that it takes to deploy CTR personnel and equipment could hamper effectiveness.</td>
<td>• Maintain WMD expertise for future elimination scenarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Congressional changes and budget cuts threaten the future of the program.</td>
<td>• Seek legislative changes for the “notwithstanding” authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The boundary between public health and CTR biosecurity programs is unclear.</td>
<td>• Reduce approval timelines within DoD through delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is a lack of common metrics to determine the effectiveness of CTR.</td>
<td>• Establish clear prioritization given budget constraints.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The message on the continuing importance of CTR is not well articulated</td>
<td>• Develop a more productive method of engaging the combatant commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Better align CTR within US Government to ensure contribution to crisis response and to sustain capabilities.</td>
<td>• Facilitate emergency response and consequence management through an all-hazards approach; extend authorities for training and equipping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare for less than permissive environments, surprises and new/evolving threats through contingency/scenario based planning.</td>
<td>• Continue progress on advancing both strategic and programmatic metrics; share amongst the interagency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Include CTR in the planning process for crisis response</td>
<td>• Clear message on CTR needs to be developed/articulated and engagement with Congress is key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global Health Security Agenda</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Determining the roles and benefits for DoD in the GHSA mission space.</td>
<td>• Research will continue with expected TRAC recommendations in mid-2015.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identifying the GHSA network across DoD to include combatant commands.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Examining new GHSA technologies for future investments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identifying when a disease is a security threat; and making the determination to respond.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ongoing tension / lack of consensus about importance for DoD preparedness for health security events.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Using the Ebola outbreak as a case study, examine the DoD preparation and response to the event and identify lessons learned for future outbreaks.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Strategic Stability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The effects on and contribution to nuclear strategic stability of components of the US nuclear force structure and its classes of nuclear delivery systems.</td>
<td>• Research and review will continue with expected recommendations in late-2015. Developments in certain regions will be examined for relevant implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The impact of budget constraints and acquisition decisions on reducing or eliminating specific classes of weapon delivery systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The advantages and disadvantages of each class system, individually and as a part of the US nuclear force structure, in promoting strategic stability in steady state and crisis, achieving deterrence goals and reassuring allies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consider the effect of various types of weapons on strategic stability changes if the numbers of weapons are reduced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budget impacts on modernizing classes of weapons.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS

Chemical Biological Defense Program:
- Do not reorganize the Program at this time; address root cause issues instead.
- AT&L/NCB direct a major revision of DoDD 5160.05E to simplify roles and responsibilities and reduce ambiguities.
- AT&L/NCB direct all program elements to assess and reduce personnel requirements.
- Army continue as Executive Agent and strengthen its leadership over concept for operations (CONOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) development.
- Formalize the translational teams between JSTO and Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO).
- JSTO and JPEO provide modest level of core support to intramural labs comparable to FFRDCs to sustain SMEs and facilities, and also guidance on areas that will be competed or phased out.
- Create an independent review process that is chartered to provide a “report card” on progress. TRAC to review progress in the Spring of 2015.

Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program:
- Better align CTR within the US Government to ensure contribution to crisis response and to sustain capabilities.
- Prepare for less than permissive environments, surprises and new/evolving threats through contingency/scenario based planning.
- Include CTR in the planning process for crisis response.
- Maintain WMD expertise for future elimination scenarios.
- Seek legislative changes for the “notwithstanding” authority.
- Reduce approval timelines within DoD through delegation.
- Establish clear prioritization given budget constraints.
- Develop a more productive method of engaging the combatant commands.
- Facilitate emergency response and consequence management through an all-hazards approach; extend authorities for training and equipping.
- Continue progress on advancing both strategic and programmatic metrics; share amongst the interagency.
- Clear message on CTR needs to be developed/articulated and engagement with Congress is key.

Global Health Security Agenda:
The GHSA Preparatory Group will continue to conduct research with expected TRAC recommendations in 2015. Some questions that will be addressed include:
• What is the boundary between DoD and civilian responsibilities for GHS?
• Are there specific situations that can be defined as DoD’s mission to respond?
• Are there alternative models for DoD to become more agile in health security crises?
• Do the combatant commands see health security response as their mission (versus a supporting role)?
• Using the Ebola outbreak as a case study, what was the DoD preparation and response to the event and what are the lessons learned for future outbreaks?
• Post-Ebola, will GHSA activities continue to be seen as important?
• Where is the next Ebola and how will DoD be asked to support?

**Nuclear Strategic Stability:**
The Nuclear Strategic Stability Preparatory Group will conclude its research with expected TRAC recommendations in late-2015. Future areas of focus include:
- Threat and or use of nuclear weapons and their role in regional conflicts.
- Capability requirements for regional strategic stability and extended deterrence that are less prominent in global “traditional” nuclear stability assessment.
- Extended deterrence and assurance of allies, and the role of nuclear weapons, in key regions such as Northeast Asia and Europe.
CONCLUSION

In CY14, the TRAC provided valuable recommendations on issues related to the Chemical, Biological Defense Program and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that will help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts for the Department of Defense. Going into 2015, the TRAC will continue to provide actionable recommendations that align CWMD activities with DoD priorities specifically on Global Health Security and Nuclear Strategic Stability but will also include other CWMD issues of concern to AT&L.
APPENDIX A. CHARTER

Charter
Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

1. **Committee’s Official Designation:** The Committee shall be known as the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (“the Committee”).

2. **Authority:** The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 (5 U.S.C., Appendix, as amended) and 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.50(d), established the Committee.

3. **Objectives and Scope of Activities:** The Committee shall provide independent advice and recommendations on matters relating to combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as set forth in paragraph 4 below.

4. **Description of Duties:** The Committee shall provide the Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)), independent advice and recommendations on:
   
   a. Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons;
   
   b. Combating WMD to include non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management;
   
   c. Nuclear deterrence transformation, nuclear material lockdown and accountability;
   
   d. Nuclear weapons effects;
   
   e. The nexus of counterproliferation and counter WMD terrorism; and
   
   f. Other AT&L, NCB, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) mission-related matters, as requested by the USD(AT&L).

5. **Agency or Official to Whom the Committee Reports:** The Committee shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the USD(AT&L).

6. **Support:** The Department of Defense (DoD), through the Office of the USD(AT&L), the Office of the ASD(NCB) Defense Programs, and DTRA, shall provide support, as deemed necessary, for the Committee’s performance, and shall ensure compliance with the requirements of the FACA, the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (5 U.S.C. § 552b, as amended) (“the Sunshine Act”), governing Federal statutes and regulations, and established DoD policies and procedures.
7. **Estimated Annual Operating Costs and Staff Years**: The estimated annual operating cost, to include travel, meetings, and contract support, is approximately $680,000. The estimated annual personnel costs to the DoD are 2.1 full-time equivalents.

8. **Designated Federal Officer**: The Designated Federal Officer (DFO), pursuant to DoD policy, shall be a full-time or permanent part-time DoD employee, and shall be appointed in accordance with established DoD policies and procedures.

In addition, the Committee’s DFO is required to be in attendance at all committee and subcommittee meetings for the entire duration of each and every meeting. However, in the Charter Threat Reduction Advisory Committee absence of the Committee’s DFO, an Alternate DFO, duly appointed to the Committee, according to the DoD policies and procedures, shall attend the entire duration of the Committee or subcommittee meeting.

The DFO, or the Alternate DFO, shall call all of the Committee’s and subcommittee’s meetings; prepare and approve all meeting agendas; and adjourn any meeting when the DFO, or the Alternate DFO, determines adjournment to be in the public interest or required by governing regulations or DoD policies and procedures.

9. **Estimated Number and Frequency of Meetings**: The Committee shall meet at the call of the Committee’s DFO, in consultation with the Chair. The estimated number of Committee meetings is four per year.

10. **Duration of the Committee**: The need for this advisory function is on a continuing basis; however, this charter is subject to renewal every two years.

11. **Termination Date**: The Committee shall terminate upon completion of its mission or two years from the date this charter is filed, whichever is sooner, unless extended by the Secretary of Defense or designee.

12. **Committee Membership**: The Committee shall be comprised of no more than 20 members who are eminent authorities in the fields of national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, WMD, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology.

The Committee members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense and their appointments shall be renewed on an annual basis in accordance with DoD policies and procedures. Those members, who are not full-time or permanent part-time Federal officers or employees, shall be appointed as experts or consultants, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3109, to serve as special government employee (SGE) members. Committee members who are full-time or permanent part-time Federal employees shall be appointed, pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.130(a), to serve as regular government employee (RGE) members.
Committee members shall, with the exception of reimbursement for official Committee-related travel and per diem, serve without compensation, unless otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with USD(AT&L) and the ASD(NCB), shall select the Committee’s Chair and Vice Chair from among the membership approved by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may approve the appointment of Committee members for one-to-four year terms of service; however, no member, unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, may serve more than two consecutive terms of service, to include its subcommittees, or serve on more than two DoD Federal advisory committees at one time. Each Committee member is appointed to provide advice on the basis of his or her best judgment without representing any particular point of view and in a manner that is free from conflict of interest.

13. **Subcommittees:** The Department, when necessary and consistent with the Committee’s mission and DoD policies and procedures, may establish subcommittees, task forces, or working groups to support the Committee. Establishment of subcommittees will be based upon written determination, to include terms of reference, by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the USD(AT&L), as the Committee’s Sponsor.

Such subcommittees shall not work independently of the chartered Committee, and shall report their findings and advice solely to the Committee for full deliberation and discussion. Subcommittees have no authority to make decisions and recommendations, verbally or in writing, on behalf of the chartered Committee. No subcommittee or any of its members can update or report directly to the DoD or to any Federal officers or employees.

All subcommittee members shall be appointed in the same manner as the Committee members; that is, the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall appoint subcommittee members to a term of service of one-to-four years, with annual renewals, even if the member in question is already a Committee member. Subcommittee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms of service, without approval by the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Subcommittee members are appointed to provide advice on the basis of their best judgment without representing a particular point of view and in a manner that is free from conflict of interest.

Subcommittee members, if not full-time or part-time government employees, shall be appointed to serve as experts or consultants, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3109, to serve as SGE members. Those individuals who are full-time or permanent part-time Federal officers or employees shall be appointed, pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.130(a), to serve as RGE members. With the exception of reimbursement for official Committee-related travel and per diem, subcommittee members shall serve without compensation.
All subcommittees operate under the provisions of FACA, the Sunshine Act, governing Federal statutes and regulations, and established DoD policies and procedures.

14. Recordkeeping: The records of the Committee and its subcommittees shall be handled according to section 2, General Records Schedule 26, and governing DoD policies and procedures. These records shall be available for public inspection and copying, subject to the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (U.S.C. § 552, as amended).

15. Filing Date: May 30, 2014
APPENDIX B. CURRENT MEMBERS

Amb. Ronald F. Lehman, II, Chair
Dr. Miriam E. John, Vice Chair

**MG Donna Barbisch (Ret.)**
Hon. Joseph A. Benkert
RADM Kenneth Bernard (Ret.)
Hon. Richard A. Falkenrath
Dr. Gigi K. Gronvall
*Dr. Gwen Hall*
Sen. Gary W. Hart (Ret.)
*Amb. Reno Harnish*
*Dr. Sig Hecker*

Ms. Jill M. Hruby
Amb. Robert G. Joseph
Dr. Robert P. Kadlec
LTG Francis H. Kearney III, USA (Ret.)
Hon. Susan J. Koch
Hon. Michael Nacht
Dr. John F. Reichart
Dr. Jeffrey M. Starr
Ms. Eileen S. Vergino

*Terms of Service completed effective:
30 November 2014*